



































So, it's time to start, ladies and gentlemen. Now, I'm pleased to announce the opening of the
symposium on the Tokyo Trial, broadening of horizon of Tokyo Trial debate, and its subtitle is
"Postwar Japan and the Japanese Soul." I'm Toshio Shinohara, director of institute of comparative
law at Kokushikan University, I'm very glad to serve as the MC for this symposium. Very pleased to
have all the attendees where I serve as an MC. Looking forward to the presentations.
Now, I'd like to move on to the first part of the program for this symposium. And I believe that
we have distributed the programme for today's session, that's on the first page on your deck. So, the
symposium will be proceeded according to the agenda topics. So, just checking, that there's a
housekeeping matter for your materials at hand, make sure that you have the whole deck. Now I'm
going to check on the handouts, distributed materials on your desks. The Japanese version of the
summary. Second is English version. This is a summary of this symposium. And then if you turn to
the materials portion, so that is documents that consist of some documents of each presenter, a
summary representation, and some history or time table, there are two sheets in your package. There
are some attachments, back-to-back documents. So, do you have all of those documents in your
package? And there's an inquiry form or question form where you are expected to enter your
questions and then the secretariat member will give you more information as to how to fill in this
form. And another sheet of paper written in both Japanese and English and then this is something I
would like to ask you to fill in at the end of this symposium. This is a questionnaire regarding the
symposium. And then the last attachment is Professor Osten's material to support his lecture. This is
related to his presentation on international criminal law. Have you checked the content of your
package and is there anything missing from your deck? And then please talk to the receptionist or the
secretariat members. Any questions?
If not, we'd like to get into the actual attended topics. Originally, the president of Kokushikan
University was expected to give an opening address first, but because of this university festival going
on right now, the president has some extenuating circumstances he has to attend to, and then, before
that, I will give some information, introduction on the lecturers first and after that we'd like to invite
him to give an opening address. And thank you for your understanding.
So, now, I'm going to introduce presenters for the morning session, starting with Dr. Mike
Mochizuki, so could you please stand and then let's give you a round of applause. And then, Dr.
Mike Mochizuki is an associate professor at George Washington University and then title, or the
theme of his speech is "Debate in the United States concerning the Tokyo Trial."
The next speaker is Dr. Yoshinobu Higurashi. Thank you. He is a professor at Teikyo University,
and today's topic for his presentation is "Political History of the Tokyo Trial." Looking forward to
that.
Moving on to the third speaker, Dr. Philip Osten. Dr. Osten is a professor at Keio University and
today's theme for him is "Tokyo Trial and International Criminal Law."
The fourth speaker is Dr. Kei Ushimura. Dr. Ushimura is operating in Kyoto and then
International Research Center for Japanese Studies and at the same time he is concurrently serving as
a professor at the Graduate University for Advanced Studies, and his topic for today's presentation is
"Japan's Response to the Judgment of Civilization."
So, it seems that president of the university is on his way to come over to this venue. There is a
ceremony downstairs being conducted so he's attending that ceremony and then make sure that he
will be here. And so, could you wait a moment before he makes an appearance? Thank you.
While waiting for him to come here, I would like you to spend some time to look into today's
materials.
According to the latest information, President Miura just finished his address for the university
festival and he's about to arrive here, so just wait for a little while.
President Miura seems now in the elevator to come to this venue.
So I'd like to make sure today's time table, and I'd like to describe what's going to happen in the
morning session. Sorry for the quite small fonts. And we commenced at 10 o'clock, and after Mr.
Miura's address, and Dr. Mike Mochizuki will have the floor for 30 minutes and Dr. Higurashi will
have the floor at quarter to eleven. For each of the lecturers is going to spend 30 minutes for the
presentation, so it seems that President Miura is now walking to this venue. And after 30 minutes, a
presentation by Dr. Higurashi, then Professor Osten will do a 30-minute presentation that's followed
by Dr. Ushimura's presentation. We are going to take a break at quarter past 12. After then, we are
going to resume the session at 1:10.
And as for the speakers in the afternoon session, I'd like to spend a few minutes to introduce. So,
but there might be some lecturers, some of the participants which may take a leave just in the
morning session, so I'd like to spend some time for the introduction for the afternoon session.
First Professor Kevin Doak for the first speaker in the afternoon session and Professor Doak is
now teaching at Georgetown University and he's talking about the Tokyo Trial and the nationalism in
postwar Japan.
Then, we are going to have Professor Ikeda.
Then, Dr. Taketoshi Yamamoto and he's now honorary professor of Waseda University and
Hitotsubashi University.
And the last presenter is Professor Takahashi from Meisei University.
So, I just introduced those four presenters in the afternoon session. While doing so, President























Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your kind introduction, the president of
Kokushikan University. And I heard that this symposium would start at 10 o'clock, but
simultaneously the opening ceremony for Kokushikan University's festival was being held in the
same timeframe, so I'm quite sorry for my late arrival to this venue. But on behalf of Kokushikan
University I'd like to say a few words for the opening of this symposium.
Thank you very much for your attendance for this symposium - broadening the horizon of the
Tokyo Trial debate - hosted by the comparative legal institute of the faculty of law. And today's
theme is the Tokyo Trial. The Tokyo Trial has caused a huge impact on the postwar Japanese [/...]
and also on the national framework in the postwar era, and the Tokyo Trial has so many aspects for
debate, and as the subtitle shows, "Postwar Japan and the Japanese Soul," the purpose of this
symposium is to do analysis and discussion, and from that perspective of postwar Japan and the
Japanese soul.
For this purpose, we have invited two researchers from the United States and also invited six
researchers from Japan. All of the presenters today, all of them are literally the forefront of the
research about Tokyo Trial on the global arena.
So we are going to spend a full day for this symposium, and I do believe that this symposium will
elevate the level of the research standard and discussion levels for the Tokyo Trial. And we do
believe that will broaden the horizon of the debate. And this symposium is in a series of events
which is to take place three years away for the 100th anniversary of the university's inauguration.
So, I hope that you will understand the purpose of this symposium so you will spend a significant
day by attending this symposium. With this, I'd like to conclude my remarks. Thank you very much.
Debates in the United States Concerning the Tokyo Trial
Good morning, everyone. Because we have such excellent interpreters, I am going to give my
remarks in English, but I will try to speak as slowly as I can so that the interpretation will stay in line
with what I am saying. First, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the hosts and organizers of
this symposium on the Tokyo Trial, to President Miura, Professor Shinohara and especially Professor
Ikeda for inviting me to participate in this historic conference. It is truly an honor to participate in a
program that includes so many Japanese scholars and experts of the Tokyo Trial - from whom I have
learned much about the trial over the years.
My presentation this morning will deal with the changing debate in the United States concerning
the Tokyo Trial.
Although the Tokyo Trial gets little attention in American public discourse, references to this
tribunal occasionally surface in the U.S. media. They usually appear in the context of visits by
Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine where some of the so-called Class-A war criminals
were enshrined in 1978. When Prime Minister Koizumi made his annual visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine, many American commentators were concerned that his visits suggested that he was
challenging the judgments of the Tokyo Trial that was a key aspect of the San Francisco peace
settlement between Japan and the United States and other countries.
The American media in general suspects that visits by the Japanese prime minister to Yasukuni
suggest an effort to overturn the judgment of the Tokyo Trial. This suspicion is understandable when
we consider the original motivation and circumstances to enshrine those Japanese leaders who had
been accused or convicted of Class-A war crimes during the Tokyo tribunal. The head priest of the
Yasukuni Shrine at the time, Matsudaira Nagayoshi, explained his decision to enshrine the so-called
Class-A war criminals in the following way. He believed that the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East was a major obstacle in Japan's quest to revise the postwar constitution that had been
imposed by the United States. In other words, the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals indeed
symbolized an effort to challenge the judgment of the Tokyo Trial and the so-called Tokyo Trial view
of history.
In October 2005, however, the Japanese government issued a statement explaining Prime Minister
Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni in order to allay this concern. The October 2005 statement noted the
8
following. I quote: "The Prime Minister has stated clearly that the purpose of his visits to the shrine
is to express respect and gratitude to the many people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not
visit for the sake of the Class-A war criminals, and that Japan accepted the results of the International
Military Tribunal of the Far East."
But despite this government statement, American media concerns about so-called Japanese
historical revisionism have persisted. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's meeting with the son of
Radhabinod Pal, who wrote the famous dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Trial, during the prime
minister's visit in August 2007 to India stirred controversy in the U.S. media. Prime Minister Abe's
reservations about the so-called "Tokyo war crimes trial view of history," which he expressed in his
book "Toward a Beautiful Country," are seen as symptomatic of a neo-nationalist and historical
revisionist wave in contemporary Japan.
Despite the above concerns, most American media stories unfortunately contain little substantive
analysis about the achievements or flaws of the Tokyo Trial.
Scholarly works and commentary in the United States, however, provide a much more complex
and nuanced picture, and there has been a lively American debate between critics and defenders of
the Tokyo trial that spans five decades.
So, in my view, the American discourse about the Tokyo Trial has gone through four phases or
cycles.
First, the first phase involved the initial sharp criticisms of the Tokyo Trial as a flawed, a
fundamentally flawed, judicial proceeding that was essentially "victor's justice."
Then there was the second phase. The second phase involved the publication of books that
defended the trial despite the legal flaws because the trial revealed the horrific atrocities committed
by Japan during World War II.
Then there was a third phase. The third phase involved a new wave of criticisms of the trial that
differed fundamentally from the initial round of criticisms. Rather than criticizing the trial for its ex
post facto application of international law or for its flaws in terms of legal process, the new wave of
critics criticized the trial because of what the trial failed to do -the sin of omission.
Finally, I would propose that we are now in a new phase of scholarship and discourse about the
Tokyo Trial. In this fourth phase, studies about the Tokyo Trial give a more positive assessment by
placing the trial in the larger historical context about the development of international law and norms
against wartime atrocities.
In my presentation, what I would like to do is to provide examples of scholarly works and
commentary published in the United States for each of these four phases in the evolution of US
discourse about the Tokyo Trial.
So first, let me begin with the early criticisms of the Tokyo Trial
This really starts in 1964, 50 years ago, and it began with the renowned Harvard University
political theorist Judith Shklar who published Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials in which
she examines both the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In contrast to a generally positive assessment of
Nuremberg, Professor Shklar criticized the Tokyo Trial. She quoted with some sympathy from Judge
Pal's dissenting opinion at Tokyo to show that the prosecution case about Japan committing the
crime of aggressive war was much less persuasive than in the case of Nazi Germany. She concluded
that, quote, "the historic causes of the war simply defy legal judgment," and she alluded to Judge
Pal's sharp distinction between Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.
For her, unlike Nazi Germany, Japan was not a totalitarian system, but rather "a traditionalist order
in which public opinion remained an operative force." Moreover, whereas Nazi Germany's extreme
criminal acts justified and necessitated Nuremberg, Professor Shklar found dubious the notion of
charging leaders for failing to prevent atrocities as opposed to directly committing or ordering such
atrocities.
Now, the most influential book-length critique by an American scholar is Richard Minear's Victors'
Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial which was first published in 1971, and I believe this book is
very well-known in Japan. Professor Minear questioned the Tokyo Trial's standing in terms of
international law and argued that the state of international law was "at best uncertain" regarding six
key legal issues in the trial: (1) the criminality of conspiracy, (2) the responsibility of individuals
with respect to state acts, (3) the criminality of aggressive war, (4) the definition of aggression, (5)
the problem of retroactivity, and (6) the notion of negative criminality.
For Professor Minear, trying and punishing those guilty of "conventional war crimes" was legally
sanctioned under The Hague and Geneva conventions, but "crimes against peace" and "crimes
against humanity" stretched the legal meaning of war crimes that had existed in 1945.
Professor Minear also criticized the Tokyo Trial in terms of legal process. He saw the trial as
problematic regarding the selection ofjustices, the rules of operation, the selection of the defendants,
and the rules of evidence. Professor Minear insisted that the Tokyo Trial was a case of "victor's
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justice." And he wrote, there was a certain amount of hypocrisy in the Tokyo Trial, he said, "There
can be no doubt that the victor nations in the Pacific war committed many of the acts for which the
Japanese stood indicted at Tokyo."
And examples of this, for Professor Minear, the Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan
despite the 1941 neutrality pact between these two powers constituted a "crime against peace." And
the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki amounted to a "crime against humanity"
that the Tokyo Trial's charter defined as "inhumane acts against any civilian population."
Finally, Professor Minear challenged the notion that the Tokyo Trial provided "the definitive
history of the prewar years" as the majority judgment sought to do. While acknowledging that "the
definitive history of prewar Japan has not yet been written," Professor Minear cited recent American
scholarship, not just Japanese scholarship but recent American scholarship, to declare "it seems
already clear that there was no historical conspiracy even remotely similar to the conspiracy
described in the majority judgment."
A number of other American scholars of Japan echoed the critiques provided by Professors Shklar
and Minear. And since I can see that I'm running out of time, I won't go into their arguments, but
prominent Asian scholars like the late Robert Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley
criticized the Tokyo Trial in 1976. In a 1980 book on the American occupation of Japan, Professor
John Curtis Perry of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy stated that, "The
crime of conspiracy has no legal basis in international law..." These were some of the criticisms that
you heard in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s against the Tokyo Trial.
Then, we enter into another phase of defense of the Tokyo Trial despite the influence and impact
of critical works by Professor Minear and Shklar. And one of these defenders of the trial was Arnold
Brackman who published an eyewitness account of the trial entitled The Other Nuremberg. It was
published in 1987 posthumously. And although he said that this was the "untold story of the Tokyo
war crimes trials" which was based on transcripts, notebooks, official and unofficial documents, and
a lot of interviews, unfortunately, Mr. Brackman unfortunately did not provide citations for the points
he made in the text. This was not a scholarly work; it was a more journalistic work. But it was a very
readable book and he captured vividly the brutality of Japanese wartime behavior.
Mr. Brackman's book emphasizes the similarity between Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. And
there was a very positive review of Brackman's book in the New York Times book review section,
written by the respected Yale University diplomatic historian Gaddis Smith. This is what Professor
Smith of Yale wrote about Brackman's account: "His chapters on wanton rape, torture and murder of
civilians and prisoners of war are gruesome in the extreme, almost equal in sickening impact to the
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accounts of the Nazi death camps. In spite of the fact that Japanese used the weeks between
surrender and the time they came under direct occupation control to destroy tons of incriminating
documentary evidence, the prosecution compiled an indisputable case of systematic terrorism."
There was also another positive account of the Tokyo Trial published by Professor Timothy Maga
called Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials, published in 2001. And Professor Maga
acknowledged that the trial was "flawed as hell," to use his phrase, but supported the trial because
this was an "amazing endeavor to punish 'evil' and to do 'the right thing' and that it expressed "good
intentions" and did "good work." Although the trial may have been legalistically flawed, because it
was dealing with evil, those flaws seem to be justified in the eyes of Professor Maga.
Now let me turn to the third phase of the American discourse, the scholarly discourse on the Tokyo
Trial. This really begins in the 1990s. There's a new wave of criticisms about the Tokyo Trial in the
United States. This new wave of criticism reflected the growing interest in issues of historical
memory, redress and reconciliation in the context of Emperor Hirohito's passing, the end of the Cold
War, increasing societal pressures for political liberalization and democratization in the Asian
countries, and the expansion of Japan's international security role. But unlike previous criticisms that
Japanese leaders - the previous criticism was that Japanese leaders have been unjustly tried and
convicted on legally dubious charges - but the new critiques argued that the trial did not go far
enough in pursuing war crimes.
One aspect of this new criticism was that the Tokyo Trial view of history distorted and confused
the issue of war responsibility. And the scholar that really articulates this view was the Columbia
University historian of Japan Carol Gluck who wrote a lead essay in the journal Daedalus which is
the journal of the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and this was an article
published in 1990.
She acknowledges that the trial was "victors'justice," but she also says that in a different sense it
was also "victims' justice," in that it contributed to the emphasis on what the Japanese people
suffered at the hands of the villains in the docket. She argues that the American decision not to try
the emperor as a war criminal, which was made in the service of running a successful occupation, set
the official question of war responsibility further from the mark. Another person who made the same
kind of argument was Professor Herbert Bix who wrote the book on Emperor Hirohito in 2000 in
which he challenges the conventional postwar image of the Showa Emperor. And he argues that the
Tokyo Trial amounted to "a joint -American-Japanese—political trial" whereby those close to
Emperor Hirohito networked with U.S. attorneys to protect the emperor.
A second criticism of the Tokyo Trial was to emphasize the "sins of omission." And although there
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was an emphasis on crimes against humanity, the Tokyo Trial failed to recognize their importance
and deliberately suppressed evidence on the most heinous cases." The most notorious in the view of
scholars has been the omission related to Unit 731 and Japan's biological warfare experimentation.
This line of criticism implied a narrowing of the "atrocity gap" between Nazi Germany and militarist
Japan. This atrocity gap was something that was behind Professor Shklar's criticism of the Tokyo
trial while defending Nuremberg. But the implication was that if you look at wartime behavior, what
Japan did was just as bad as Nazi Germany. And one professor even said that if all of the evidence
had been put forth then it might have even resembled that of the Auschwitz trials.
But then, the question is, why was this case? Why was there a sin of omission? And one Asian
American scholar, Lisa Yoneyama, an Asian-American studies scholar, argues that the reason for the
sin of omission was the racial and gender bias of the Tokyo Trial which led to downplaying and
ignoring the "crimes against humanity" committed against "tens of millions of people of color." So,
that was the third wave of discourse. It was a very critical view of the Tokyo Trial, but the argument
was different than the first wave of criticism.
And now, to end, I think we are now in the beginning of a fourth phase in discourse in American
scholarship of the Tokyo Trial. More and more you are beginning to see positive assessments of the
Tokyo trial have focused on how this tribunal along with Nuremberg contributed to the development
of international laws and norms.
Ironically, in my view, the scholar who has made the greatest contribution to this positive
reassessment of the Tokyo Trial in the United States is a scholar that was born and raised in Japan,
Professor Yuma Totani. She was born and raised in Japan and received her undergraduate degree at
International Christian University, and then she did her graduate work overseas. She received her
master's degree from the University of London and then her PhD from the University of California at
Berkeley and she now teaches at the University of Hawaii.
I feel that Professor Totani's book The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: the Pursuit of Justice in the Wake
of World War II which was published by Harvard University Press in 2008, and I think it was also
translated in the same year or a Japanese version was published in the same year, is the most
important single-authored work on the Tokyo Trial to appear in English since Richard Minear's book
Victor's Justice.
Professor Totani argues that there is much more to the trial than the notion of American "victor's
justice" over Japan and the charge of crimes against peace, which many acknowledge is a case of ex
post facto legal justice. In fact, her work also encourages us to look beyond the debates about the so-
called Tokyo Trial view of history. I don't have the time to go into the rich analysis in Professor
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Totani's book, but let me just highlight the feel of the key themes and arguments.
Professor Totani puts much greater emphasis on the prosecution of war crimes - Counts 54 and 55
at the Tokyo Trial compared to the charge of crimes against peace. And these war crimes related to
leadership responsibility for atrocities committed during the conduct of war. These atrocities
included the massacres at Nanking, Burma-Siam death railway, the cruel treatment of prisoners of
war and civilians in captured areas.
Now, Professor Totani acknowledges that the United States tended to place much greater emphasis
on the crimes against peace, the crime of launching an aggressive war, but she also acknowledges
that the international legal foundation of that charge may not have been as clear, because she says
that the Kellogg-Briand pact did not include clear wording as to whether war waged in violation of
the pact constituted an international offense or crime.
She argues that conventional war crimes were better established in international law by the time of
the International Tribunal. She shows that in contrast to the US focus on crimes against peace,
prosecutors from other countries, like prosecutors from Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, The
Netherlands and China, focused much more on conventional war crimes. Professor Totani states that
the fact that the death penalty was given only to those [...] responsibility for those war crimes, in
other words, Counts 54 or 55, rather than crimes against peace demonstrates how much weight was
ultimately given to these war crimes.
She shows that because the United States put so much emphasis on the charge of crimes against
peace, there was very little time to make the case on Counts 54 and 55. There was only six weeks'
time of time to present evidence, and the prosecution case had to be made in synopsis form.
Nevertheless, for Professor Totani, the Tokyo Trial as well as Nuremberg makes a critical
contribution to the development of international law regarding the handling of wartime atrocities.
Now, the subtitle of this symposium on the Tokyo Trial is, I believe, "Postwar Japan and Nihonjin
no Seishin, or the Japanese Soul," as it has been translated in the English version as "soul" or maybe
a better translation might be "Japanese Spirit." I am certainly aware of the Japanese commentary
today that criticizes the Tokyo Trial and the so-called Tokyo Trial view of history. And I understand
that through this criticism, some Japanese seek to restore Japan's national honor and to rediscover
"the Japanese spirit."
Although there is much to this agenda, I feel that this intellectual agenda in Japan may miss the
most important contribution of the Tokyo Trial. For the Japanese people, reflecting on the Tokyo
Trial should neither cause shame nor invoke anger or resentment. But instead, the Tokyo Trial should
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encourage national pride, that Japan has learned solemn lessons of history, that Japan has truly
become a peaceful nation, and that Japan now stands at the forefront of nations in opposing atrocities.
For me, the most important legacy of the Tokyo Trial is the ongoing search for the soul or spirit of
humanity. By incrementally working to develop international law as well as customs and norms
against atrocities and to establish international legal institutions and procedures to prevent and
prosecute horrific atrocities committed by human beings against other human beings, the
international community is in a sense acknowledging and re-discovering the true soul of humanity.
The historic role that the Tokyo Trial played in this process is, for me, the lasting significance of the















































































































































































































































































































































































Hello, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to present in
front of you, and I'd like to extend my sincere gratitude to all the concerned parties including
Kokushikan University secretariat. And I might have to speak rather fast in the interest of time, so if
you'll look at material portion, a lot of attachments and lots of information attached.
The Tokyo Trial was part of the Allied occupation policy for Japan. Initially, there are two major
objectives for the occupation, and first, the demilitarization and the second is democratization. So, to
make Japan harmless in global community, international society. So, that demilitarization culminates
the Tokyo Trial whereas the democratization culminates at the formulation of the new Japanese
constitution. So, once these two objectives are met, the Allied occupation policy can move on to the
next step of economic reconstruction. In that regard, the Tokyo Trial had such a significance.
Evaluation or assessment of the Tokyo Trial seems to be based upon dichotomy between "the
judgment of civilization" that is positive attitude toward the trial as opposed to "victor's justice" that
is negative. So, those opinions are divided. However, because the negation of the Tokyo Trial might
be considered as equal to the affirmation of militarism of Japan, and then back then, up until the
1960s, academic community which tended to be leftist, where leftist ideas were dominant, that pro-
trial, that theory was quite dominant. However, back in 1971, and there are two major books
published in both Japan and the United States. And then Richard Minear and Noboru Kojima's
publications. So there are opportunities for more of the con theory being more influential.
So, in the first place, the Tokyo Trial has a direct connection with Japan's wars in the Showa
period, so that more of an emotional ideological contentious points might play a role. So, currently
on top of that historical recognition issues and Yasukuni issues were involved in that so that is why
the settlement is very difficult for this matter. So, the Tokyo Trial is a sort of arriving point of the
wars of the Showa period, and also the starting point of a postwar ideology.
So, I'd like to take a kind of new approach for, and I'd like to take a level-headed approach of a
demonstrative political history.
According to material #1, on October 25, 1941, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
made a proposal that the punishment on Nazis war criminal should be incorporated as an objective of
Second World War, and this is in parallel with the postwar vision of the reformation of Nazi regime
according to the Atlantic charter, that's indicated in material #2, by US and UK leaders. That was
two months before this statement by Winston Churchill.
However, given that situation where the criminal punishment was incorporated into the part of
occupation policy of allied powers, the punishment, the methodology was questioned. An American
treasure department in 1944, they argued the importance of a summary execution ofNazi leaders.
However, the secretary of War, Henry Stimson, at that time, bitterly criticized this approach. This
type of summary execution is very savage or the barbarian revenge so that the more civilized
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approach of trial. So this kind of retribution that the passion for the violent retribution should be
resolved by the legal norm of a Western approach civilization and also justice.
President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States at the Casablanca conference, he made a
statement according to material #3. Both Japan and Germany, the nations, well crimes shouldn't be
charged; instead, punishing one serves as a warning to all the others, meaning that we have to punish
the leaders.
Up until the autumn of 1944, the subject of the war crimes was atrocities that they committed. So,
in the case of persecution of Jews by Nazis, there are two specific attributes. First that was the pre
war activities that was started even before the waging of the war. Second, a domestic issue for the
German problem, the Jewish Germans that were being abused. So, that ex post facto law was
established and then that's crimes against humanity.
So, and then in October and November 1944, the department of war led by Mr. Stimson was
inclined toward the idea of initiating and waging a war that should be brought to justice. According
to material #4, Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 was reinterpreted, and that should serve as a legal basis
for the war crimes, so that was another new war crimes determined afterwards.
Soviet Union, well, supported the idea of international tribunal, and even though the UK inclined
to summary execution, they compromised to the idea of the trial methodology in May 1945. So, the
lawyers from concerned parties for countries participated in the conference where the London
conference, the Nazi, the international tribunals methodology was discussed starting June 26, 1945.
According to material #5, the French delegation representative said that the initiating of aggressive
war is not considered the criminal conduct and that incrimination of the war might exceed the
framework of the current law. However, eventually, that American policy brought about the
agreement of the allied powers participating, and so that was transformed the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) that was issued on August 8, 1945. That's indicated in material
#6. So, it talks about crimes against peace, class A, and war crimes, class B, and then crimes against
humanity, class C, war crime, as were stipulated according to this IMT charter.
So, the question here is, what is the specific intent behind this international military tribunal? First
of all, they have to set the precedence of the trial of a leadership of the non-war-causing nation. And
so that international law can deter that atrocity and aggressive war. That is an aspect of "the
judgment of civilization." Second, and then they have to retain the record of Nazis' crimes so that
axis powers are evil as opposed to the allied nations' justice, so that type of good vs. evil historical
view should be confirmed, so that was a benefit for that. And also the shock therapy of punishment
of leaders has to cause some guilt feelings or sense of remorse on the part of Japanese nation or
German nation. So that kind of educational effect was expected. So that was the "victor's justice"
type of aspect. So that should serve as a security policy in the postwar international society.
So, this type of policy for Germany was deployed into the policy for Japan. So, according to the
material #7, on July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was issued, announced, and according to
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paragraph 10, "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited
cruelty upon our prisoners." So, October the 14, the government of Japan accepted this Potsdam
Declaration, so this should be the legal basis for the Tokyo Trial and the minor war crimes trials.
Japanese government was held responsible or obliged to cooperate with the war crimes trials. So this
particular point was not well-understood by many parties.
However, the wording of "war criminals" in paragraph 10 might have room for argument that the
defense of the counsel in the Tokyo Tribunal stated that at the time of acceptance the Potsdam
Declaration only renunciation of war, violation up to that was considered war crimes according to
international law. So, that was the fact that crimes against peace as well as crimes against humanity
were based upon ex post facto law so that should be outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
However, on July 26, the London conference was still going on and so "all war criminals,"
including those who have committed the abuse of POWs were just emphasized that it's sort of
ambiguous expression, so it was almost mandatory that this type ofnew war crimes was applied to
Japan as well.
And then, at that time, on September 11, 1945, Hideki Tojo was arrested by the
counterintelligence corps of occupation forces and since then the waves of arrests of began for war
criminal suspects. So, 25,000 people were arrested out of which class A war criminal suspects were a
little over 100.
The United States was the dominant power. Japanese people were quite obedient on the whole.
It's almost sort of extreme how Japanese people transformed themselves. According to material #8, it
seems according to Soho Tokutomi who was a class A war criminal suspect, he said that the subject
of worship or admiration for Japanese people changed from Germany to the United States. It seemed
that military and financial cliques were wholly responsible for the waging of war, and that people
pretend ignorance. Soho severely blamed Japanese people for unseemly behavior.
So, in the extraordinary atmosphere after the defeat, majority of Japanese people were just
imposing the responsibility for the war to military clique {Gunbatsu in Japanese) including Tojo, and
then condemned those people. It seems that, so, this senpan in Japanese, war criminal, was
established as a term to attack other people as part of that ordinary daily terms.
Now, what is the responsible for war according to the Japanese people? The UK Liaison Mission in
Japan, the current embassy, analyzed in 1946 that Japanese people didn't fully understand the
responsibility for opening of hostilities and then rather that the responsibility of the defendants were
just because of the defeat in the war.
So the definition for the responsibility for the lost war, "Haisen Sekinin" in Japanese, as indicated
by Chosaburo Mizutani of the Japan Socialist Party in 1945, there was because of a very poor war
leadership was the cause of this loss. So it seemed that currently, let's look at "class A war criminal"
and also "war criminals," these terms are just taking on a different meaning of the original meaning,
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that the responsible person for the failure or the defeat is accusable. However, it's not abrupt change.
This has a historical implication or historical background since World War II.
Was it possible to pursue responsibility for the war for Japanese by their own effort? In September
1945, there was a cabinet decision for a voluntary trial plan limited to those lower class soldiers who
committed atrocities. According to material #9, Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara back then at that
time of the lower house assembly, it's not desirable to pursue the responsibility of war as a deadly
feud among Japanese nationals. Part of the leadership that was responsible for the war were just
arrested and then examined as part of the Allied war crimes courts, so that was the defense made by
Shidehara. According to material #9, Shigeru Yoshida, the next prime minister, in 1946, he defended
the national government of Japan was collaborating with the allied powers in terms of the Tokyo
Trial. Japanese government didn't have the intention of conducting their own trial out of their own
volition. Prime Minister Yoshida tried to use the Tokyo Trial as an atonement ceremonry for the past,
and to fulfill Japan's postwar rehabilitation and wester orientation.
The International Prosecution Section (IPS), a staff section of General Headquarters (GHQ),
started working from December 1945, and they faced serious lack of evidence from the beginning
because masses of confidential papers were burned just before or since the surrender by the
ministries and also newspaper companies and therefore hearing an interview was extremely
important and they discovered some private and public important documents including documents
from the foreign ministry and diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal
for the Emperor. And from the viewpoint of political history, collection of a huge amount of
information in a short amount of time I believe is the biggest significance of the Tokyo Trial.
On April 29, 1946, 28 Japanese leaders were indicted in the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East (IMTFE). It was different from Nuremberg. Japanese leaders were not as well known in the
global arena. And therefore they chose to indict their representatives of important incidents and
organizations. In this case, the biggest fear for Japan was for the emperor Hirohito to be indicted.
Even within the prosecutionteam, they thought it would be possible to convict the emperor. However,
that would cause serious backlash by the Japanese people which would have been an erroneous
decision politically speaking. So the possibility of emperor's indictment was extremely low
according to my assessment.
The prosecution divided the leaders versus normal Japanese people, saying that "the criminal
military clique" was controlling the national policy of Japan, and from 1928 of Huanggutun incident
(Zhang Zuolin Assassination Incident), until the end of war in 1945, they said that there was criminal
conspiracies and accused the defendants for aggressive war and atrocities.
The only thing that was charged was actions on the part of Japanese and even if the allied powers
did similar acts, that was not indicted or used for rebuttal. In material #12, you can see how
Attorney General of England David Maxwell-Fyfe pointed two points that the allied powers tried
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to evade. One related to the Nazis propaganda in the court, and the other one was questioning the
actions of the allied in the court.
But still, the defense lawyers mentioned the atomic bombing and Soviet Union's participation in
the war, and in Nuremberg as well, the random bombing in Dresden was criticized. The appeal to
hypocrisy, "tu quoque" claim is very convincing. As you can see in material #13, a sailor of Japanese
battleship Musashi, Kiyoshi Watanabe, talked about the absurdity of "victor's justice." He believes
that both the United States and Japan did similar things.
Now, there were two main arguments within the defense attorneys' team. One was trying to
defend the nation, to protect the honor of the state, and the other was trying to aim for acquittal of the
individuals. But in the actual proceedings, the individuals of the defense focused on basically how
the individuals tried to avoid the war and how they didn't have administrative authority to do certain
things. Japanese citizens were disappointed with excuses made by these defendants.
That is why from the end of 1947 to the next January, Tojo Hideki presented a war self-defense
argument and scored a big point over Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan, which gave Japanese people
a sense of relief and also pushed up Tojo's reputation. This was a time when Japanese people were
not in a position to be able to criticize the occupation forces, and the tribunal was the only place
where they felt equal in saying what they had to say.
Now, in Nuremberg, there were only German defense attorneys but in Japan GHQ proposed to
include American lawyers in the defense team to avoid the criticism of "victor's justice." Because
then Japanese lawyers would lack the knowledge of Anglo-American law and also linguistic skills
which would make the trial a fixed trial.
In the beginning, the American lawyers were not trusted, nobody believed that an enemy would
seriously defend Japanese defendants, but that prejudice went away as the trial proceeded and the
American lawyers were more appreciated. The biggest reason being the American lawyers were very
faithful to their duties. In the summation by William Logan, he stated that the war of economy was
strongly and abruptly suppressed and the decision was a life or death decision for the mother country.
Itsuro Hayashi, defense attorney, thanked for "the cooperation with integrity" by the American
lawyers. As you can see in material #15, a prominent political scientist, Masao Maruyama Moriyama
also said that Japanese people were impressed by the fact that American lawyers did so much for the
Japanese defendants without regard to their own nationality.
All the judges were from the allied powers. No neutral country was represented. This was because
the lack of contribution by the neutral countries to the defeat of the Axis Powers as well as the war
crimes problem during the war.
Chiefjustice William Webb took 12 days to read the majority opinion, the decision, starting from
November 4, 1948. There was a serious conflict in terms of whether or not the aggressive war should
be regarded as a crime. And Judge William Patrick from England engineered the majority of seven
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which basically consider aggressive war criminal based on the international law, similar to
Nuremberg.
So, the majority opinion found that there was a conspiracy of the military clique from 1928 to
1945, trying to control the eastern Asian, western and southwest pacific area.
25 defendants were sentenced on November 12, 1948. And as you can see in material #11 once
again, seven were sent to the gallows, two received imprisonment, and sixteen life imprisonment,
and nobody was acquitted.
Out of the seven that were to be hanged, former prime minister and foreign minister Koki Hirota
was the only civil official and the rest were in the army. And what was the justification for their
death sentences? Well, decisive material has not been uncovered. It is likely that such document
would exist but it has not been found. So nobody knows the real answer to that question. But we can
deduce that most likely Hirota was executed because of the fact that he was the foreign minister at
the time of the Nanking massacre which is referenced in material #16. And there are American and
British official documents that provide a justification to believe that atrocities was the reason for the
death sentence as you can see in material #17. Both the United States and Britain believed that it
would be difficult to justify the death sentence based on crime against peace which could be
questioned as ex post facto law. So, the justification of the death sentence was serious atrocity, not
crime against peace. If you could please look at material #18, you can see that former prime minister
Tojo was executed because of his responsibility for the maltreatment of prisoners of war and
detainees, and not for initiating of the Pacific war.
Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida at the time of the resignation of the cabinet en masse wrote in his
diary that "this decision would not cause a big reaction either inside or outside Japan," and his
prediction came true. There was no objection of Japanese people.
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida intended to use this trial as a turning point for Japan to be more
cooperative with the US and Britain. And most of the professional politicians and bureaucrats were
silent which both indicated passive acceptance of the decision of the trial. In the case of mass media,
because of the gag rules of the occupation forces, major newspapers affirmed the ruling in the
context of peace and democracy. Now, the intellectuals who were at the Peace Problem Symposium
(Heiwa Mondai Danwakai) positively affirmed the result of the Tokyo Trial in connection with
pacifism and peaceful constitution.
What about Japanese people in general? They didn't necessarily directly receive influence and
accept the results. Britain continued to lament the fact that Japanese people were not interested in the
Tokyo Trial. American diplomat William Sebald after the trial said that the majority of the Japanese
people saw the Tokyo Trial as "victor's justice." So general Japanese public were shocked to see the
atrocities for the first time during these proceedings and positioned themselves as victims, thanking
that the defendants should be responsible for aggression. So there was no remorse in the minds of the
Japanese people who lost confidence during the occupation, indeed, the antipathy towards "victor's
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justice" never went away, so there was a mixture of views of "the judgment of civilization" and




















































































































































































































































Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to speak here. At first, I would like to say
thank you, especially, to the staff and colleagues of Kokushikan University. Let me say a few brief
words about my connection with Kokushikan University: When I was a graduate school student, I
had the privilege to browse some original trial documents in the library of Kokushikan University
while writing my doctoral thesis on the Tokyo Trial. Thus, I benefitted considerably from the library
of Kokushikan University. In this way, I had a quite close connection with Kokushikan University
since those days. Hence, I am glad to be back here today.
Today, I would like to talk about the Tokyo Trial seen from the viewpoint of international
criminal law, focusing on the elements of crime and the significant contribution of the trial to the
formation of modern international criminal law.
66 years have passed since the Tokyo Trial ended in 1948. As is widely known, Tokyo Trial was,
along with the Nuremberg trial, the first international criminal tribunal to adjudicate war criminals.
While the Tokyo Trial has, admittedly, been regarded as a historical "experiment", it has not much
been discussed with a view to its significance for the formation of international criminal law. In
particular, for a long time there had been very little academic debate regarding the elements of
crimes as applied by the court. This only changed recently: Japan's accession to the Rome Statute in
2007 triggered domestic discussions on international criminal law and the International Criminal
Court (ICC), to a certain degree.
International criminal law essentially deals with the criminal responsibility for the most serious
international crimes as well as the prosecution and punishment thereof. Based on this understanding,
international criminal law establishes direct individual criminal responsibility under international law,
without any reference to domestic law..
In the past few years, Japan has experienced a kind of renaissance in international criminal law.
Notwithstanding, the Tokyo Trial is even now often regarded as a mere "rehashing" of the
Nuremberg Trial; its unique legal significance is widely ignored, because (with very few exceptions)
no efforts were made to examine the significance of the Tokyo Trial in the context of the formation
* The original presentation was held in Japanese. This English translation was subsequently compiled primarily based on
the interpreters' notes.
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of modern international criminal law. Following the accession to the ICC, the so-called "core cimes"
under international criminal law are now being discussed in Japan, too, as if these concepts have
existed since before as a given reality. Thus, I would like to talk about why that legal framework has
been widely ignored even though the Tokyo Trial has greatly contributed to its fundaments. In my
presentation, I would like to focus on the crimes as stipulated in the charger of the Tokyo Trial
(Tokyo charter), as the notion of these crimes has been most intensely debated during the trial. At the
same time, these crimes also constitute the starting point of a development which led up to the
definition of core crimes in the ICC Statute. Furthermore, regarding specific aspects of the crimes, I
would like to make a (limited) comparison with the Nuremberg Trial. Altogether, my presentation
will try to outline some of the contributions of the Tokyo Trial to the development of current
international criminal law.
II. Characteristics of the Tokyo Trial in Terms of Substantive Law
As for the crimes under the Tokyo charter, there has not been a thorough discussion among
Japanese legal scholars, except for a short period directly after the end of World War II. However,
from a legal standpoint, there crimes deserve a thorough legal examination. Article 5 of the Tokyo
charter stipulates three different crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity, all of which are largely based on the Nuremberg charter - with some differences, as we
shall see.
Furthermore, the Tokyo charger provides in its Paragraph 2 of Article 5 for the crime of
"conspiracy".
1. Conventional War Crimes
According to the charter, conventional war crimes are deemed "violation of the laws or customs
of war". At any rate it is noteworthy that objections concerning ex postfacto legislation have not
been raised (even by the defendants) with a view to conventional war crimes because of their
character as customary international law. This already demonstrates that it is not appropriate to
undertake a sweeping criticism of all crimes under the Tokyo charter in a lump, and that it is of great
significance to differentiate and discuss the different crimes one by one
With regards to war crimes, the concept of "command responsibility" had been widely adopted
even in some of the so-called B and C Class war crimes trials against Japanese. From the viewpoint
of substantive law, this concept, in a nutshell, deals with the responsibility of those commanders who
knowingly or by negligence failed to prevent their subordinates from committing war crimes
(intentional/negligent omission). The significance of command responsibility from the perspective of
procedural law is that criminal responsibility of military commanders could be established even if the
prosecutor could not prove that the accused ordered his own troops to violate the laws of war.
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Command responsibility is now also stipulated in Article 28 of the ICC Statute based on its character
as customary international law.
2. Crimes against Humanity
Crimes against humanity were first stipulated in the Nuremberg charter and the Tokyo charter.
According to Article 5 of the Tokyo charter, crimes against humanity were defined as "murder,
extermination, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts, before or during
the war" or "persecutions on political or racial grounds (...)"• This legal definition forms just a slight
modification of the Nuremberg charter. The most considerable modification is the deletion of the
word "civilian population"; thus, the object of crimes against humanity under the Tokyo charter was
not solely limited to the civilian population, with the effect that this provision could also be
applicable to inhumane conduct against combatants. The difference between the Tokyo Trial and the
Nuremberg Trial regarding crimes against humanity lies, therefore, in the non-limitation of the scope
of persons to be protected by this notion. As Professor Higurashi pointed out, the concept of crimes
against humanity was originally drafted with a view to the prosecution of ideologically motivated
Nazi crimes, namely crimes against people who did not fall in the scope of conventional war crimes,
in particular specific citizens of the own state (including religious or ethnic groups) or nationals of
third states. However, by extending the scope even to non-combatants, it became difficult to
distinguish crimes against humanity from conventional war crimes; i.e. in the case that non-
combatants would become victims of conventional war crimes, the conduct in question could be
regarded also as a crime against humanity so that the border between the two categories of crime was
less obvious than under the Nuremberg charter.
As mentioned above, crimes against humanity were rather vague and there have been some
overlaps with other crimes, which explains their minor role in the Tokyo trial. This can also be seen
in the fact that crimes against humanity did not form an independent category of counts, but were
indicted in one category together with the counts related to war crimes ("Conventional War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity") - in contrast to the Nuremberg trial. After all, there was no
submission of evidence by the prosecutor to establish specific crimes against humanity, to the effect
that no defendant was convicted of (singular) crimes against humanity in Tokyo.
Seen from the legal standpoint, there has been no substantial discussion of the concept of crimes
against humanity at the Tokyo trial. Nevertheless, along with the general development of
international criminal law, the notion of "crimes against humanity" has developed continuously since
then, also resulting partially in the creation of the crime of genocide, and, more recently, in the
adoption of this concept in the ICC statute (and, before that, the statues of the UN ad hoc tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
3. Crimes against Peace
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With respect to "Crimes against Peace", as shown in my handout, Article 5 of the Tokyo charter
privides: "the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of declared or undeclared war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing".
Coupled with the difficulties of providing a clear definition of a war of aggression, this category
of crime has formed the centerpiece of the contemporary discussions along with the notion of
individual responsibility for a war of aggression.
Crimes against peace and conspiracy were the two main sources of debate in the judgment of the
Tokyo Trial. In that sense, the Tokyo Trial forms a clear contrast to the Nuremberg Trial with
regards to the prosecutorial strategy: In the latter there was no comprehensive abstract discussion of
the historical-political background of the crimes committed by German Nazis, but the finding of
facts regarding individual participation and individual responsibility have been at the center of the
evidence submitted from the very beginning, whereas at the Tokyo Trial the prosecutors' principle
was to first concentrate on the proof of a national policy leading to a war of aggression. Only then,
the prosecution (and subsequently, the court) started to examine the individual involvement in and
the individual responsibility for crimes against peace by means of an analysis of the respective
evidentiary material..
The definition of crimes against peace under the Tokyo charter is also at variance with the
definition stipulated in the Nuremberg charter, with a view to the term "war of aggression", since in
the former the words "declared or undeclared" have been added. This result from the fact that Japan
waged a number of armed conflicts and military actions in the Asian and Pacific region without any
formal declaration of war. In other words, this revision of the definition of crimes against peace
served the sole purpose of applying this provision to this type of armed conflict without a declaration
of war. As we shall see, this wording considerably affected the formation of the ctime of aggression
in later international criminal law.
The defense objected the jurisdiction of the court, especially with regard to crimes against peace,
arguing that this category of crimes violated the principle of legality {nullapoena principle).
The court rejected this defense, stating that the law of the charter was legally binding, and that via
signing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan had actually accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which
supposedly provided the basis for the prosecution of crimes against pease.
Since the court considered itself bound by the Tokyo charter, it rejected the defense merely on
formalistic reasons and did not enter into a more substantive legal discussion as proposed by the
defense. The majority opinion of the Tokyo Trial was widely based on the arguments of the
judgment at the Nuremberg Trial. As the court avoided an independent decision on the basic
questions concerning substantial law, the Tokyo Trial has been subject to criticism until today.
III. The Contribution to the Development of International Criminal Law
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In the wake of the trial, the international community (i.e., mainly in the framework of the newly
created United Nations) soon proposed the creation of a (permanent) international criminal court, and,
subsequently, in the following decades little by little efforts were made to comprehensively
formulate the foundations of international criminal court law on which such a court should be based.
Milestones of this development were, inter alia, the genocide convention (1948), the Geneva
conventions (1949), and, after the end of the Cold War, the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) by the UN Security Council. This development
finally crystalized into the establishment of the (permanent) International Criminal Court (ICC). In
the Rome Statute of the ICC (adopted 1998, in force since 2002), the basic crime categories as
stipulated in Nuremberg and Tokyo have been comprehensively codified, reflecting the post-war
developments and the current stage of development in the field of international criminal law.
The basic mission of the ICC is to prosecute and punish the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole, i.e. the core crimes. The scope ofjurisdiction of the ICC covers
the four core crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Each of
those concepts is rooted in the Tokyo Trial as well as the Nuremberg principles.
In 2010, the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC conducted a review conference in order to
review and amend the ICC Statute. They reached an epoch-making agreement called the Kampala
Consensus. In this way, the concept of crimes against peace was reconfirmed and the criminality of
such crimes was clearly defined.
What is important here is the fact that the basic concepts of the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials were
reconfirmed on that occasion. To be specific, the idea of individual criminal responsibility of leaders
was combined with the renunciation of aggressive war; the elements of crime and the central modes
of liability under international criminal law were defined accordingly. Moreover, aggression will be
punishable under the ICC statute when a war of aggression is initiated "regardless whether a prior
declaration of war" was made or not; this also indicates that the Tokyo Trial exerts considerable
influence on forming the norms of international criminal law until today.
IV. The Reactions of the Japanese (Criminal) Legal Scholars
Finally, please allow me to make a brief comment on the Japanese legal society's response to the
Tokyo trial in the postwar era.
There were two major forms of reactions towards the trial: denial and approval. In these two main
groups, there are many different approaches with different conclusions. In the comprehensive
assessment of the Tokyo trial as a whole, these opinions often reflect the specific viewpoint of the
respective disputants from an ideological and political perspective. Legal scholars, especially
scholars of international law, and also historians and political scientists took up the topic of the
Tokyo trial. The attitude of Japanese criminal law scholars in the assessment of the Tokyo trial is
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of a more passive or reluctant character, namely because of the deficiencies of the trial procedure and
the judgment with respect to the basic principles of substantial and procedural criminal law.
Shigemitsu Dando, a former law professor of Tokyo University, and later a judge t the Supreme
Court of Japan established after the war under the new constitution, was one of the most influential
criminal law scholars in Japan. Professor Dando, in particular, identified three major purposes of
punishment specific to international criminal law. First, a general deterrence effect, i.e. the
punishment of war criminals will prevent international society from undertaking future wars. Second,
a special deterrent (and retributive) effect, i.e. the detention of war criminals will discourage and
prevent the convicted from committing future criminal acts. Third, the ultimate purpose of realizing
justice on an international level, thereby shaping the public conscience of the international
community (and strengthening faith in the international rule of law), thus indirectly contributing to
world peace. In the case of the Tokyo Trial, in Dando's opinion, the third purpose was not
completely achieved because at the time when the trial was conducted the international community
as such had not yet reached a status where such war criminals could be brought to justice in an
entirely impartial and fair manner. Therefore, Dando states that the Tokyo Trial should be
recognized as an expression of the effort on behalf of the international community to push
international criminal law forward towards a more ideal and complete development stage.
Turning to today's international criminal law, it seems that by exercising international criminal
jurisdiction both purposes of retribution and prevention can be secured. As for the latter, threatening
effect is not the only preventive factor of the punishment of international crimes. Rather, a more
important factor is the concept of so-called positive general deterrence, according to which punishing
international crimes contributes to strengthening the norm consciousness in the international sphere.
This type of international criminal punishment would be conducive to the stabilization of
international law norms. The non-observance of the norms of international law by way of
committing core crimes should be negated by punishment, and, thus, the norms will be restored.
This current ongoing discussion indicates that Dando was a pioneer in the theory of purpose of
punishment in international criminal law. This fact neither is known overseas nor are legal scholars
aware of it in Japan.
V. Conclusion
As we have seen, there are some unevenness's in terms of the substantive law of the Tokyo Trial;
however, in the formulation of the elements of the elements of core crimes, the Tokyo Trial
presented a normative prototype. Therefore, the Tokyo Trial was and is of precedential value to the
further development of international criminal law.
Japan was at the center of the events that resulted in the creation of modern international criminal
law. Taking account of this special legacy, Japan could henceforth play a more active role with a
view to the impartial and fair exercise of international criminal justice.
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Thank you very much for your kind attention.
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Japan's Response to the "Judgment of Civilization"
Thank you very much. I am very honored to speak in front of such a big audience. I would
like to thank all the organizers. If you have no background knowledge, then it would be easier to
understand what's been discussed today and there are eight researchers reported today, but my talk
will not require big background knowledge. I will try to speak as simply as possible with some
excerpts from some documents and hopefully you can satisfy your intellectual hunger before you
have lunch. I would like to focus on the judgment of civilization perspective and talk about specific
responses/reactions to the Tokyo Trial to understand the acceptance of the result of the trial and then,
in the context of modern contemporary Japanese history and thought history, I would like to talk
about why the judgment of civilization attracted such strong attention in terms of the discourse of the
culture in modern japan. It has been more than sixty years since the court closed in 1948 and still we
discuss the Tokyo Trial from the dichotomy perspective: victor's justice versus judgment of
civilization, as mentioned earlier; I completely agree. Now, people who advocate the judgment of
civilization tend to find a significance with the international military tribunal so they are pro-Tokyo
Trial, and those who criticize the trial as victor's justice against the Tokyo Trial, but this is really a
futile schema and labeling and does not provide us with a correct understanding of the history. Those
who administered justice, what was their definition of civilization? And those who were judged, how
did they respond to the multitude of aspects of victor's justice? We need to understand all this in
order to deeply understand the Tokyo Trial. Now, the allied claimed to upheld civilization but after
the Second World War, for example, the former Soviet Union made military intervention into
Eastern European countries. America sent troops to Vietnam. So, it is clear that they civilization they
spoke of was not of high standards, which was pointed out by many researchers in the 1980s.
Yasuaki Onuma was the international law scholar working in the faculty of law of University of
Tokyo. He was assistant professor then, now he is a professor. And he was in his late 30s or early
40s and he was a leader of the research of the Tokyo Trial. And I would like to try to look at this
material, look at page 5 of the handout. The page number of the book is also indicated in the handout,
if you are interested, go to the original source document. The Tokyo Trial positioned as justification
or justice of civilization is now hypocritical and empty. It is a very simple summation but it is okay
to dismiss this as hypocritical and empty. Professor Onuma is an expert but he only gives us a very
general simple short argument about the civilization. Now, it is true that the actions condemned
during the trial should be condemned whether it's a Western culture or Eastern culture or civilization.
But those who judged, did they have the qualifications to represent civilization in general? This was
basically an arrogance of the Western powers who believed that the Western civilization equals
civilization in general. But pointing out this arrogance, is that really sufficient as an argument? Does
that really serve the responsibility as expert? We need to think about the Tokyo Trial discourse
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through the justification of civilization. Now, civilization judgment is basically based on the opening
statement that was given by Chief Prosecutor Joseph Keenan on the 4th of June in 1946. Please look
at the reference, the quotation. He said, "Mr. President, this is no ordinary trial, for here we are
waging a part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the entire world from destruction...
They declared war against civilization." So he strongly declared this and then he continued,
"Together they planned, prepared, and initiated aggressive wars against the great democracies
enumerated in the indictment." So, this is the actual, these are the actual English sentences that he
read. So, the great democratic nations are the civilization that Keenan spoke of. So, the structure is
that it was not a war of civilization; the former allies or the great democratic powers represented
civilization and they were there to judge the non-civilization which was Japan. Under the gag rule by
the occupation army, the Japanese newspapers printed the quote from Keenan the following day with
big titles saying "War of civilization to prevent the world from disruption." But this was not [...] a
creation of Keenan; there was a precedent for this expression of civilization, judgment of civilization.
This was, of course, the Nuremberg Trial which was an international war tribunal to indict the war
crimes of Nazi Germany. About six months earlier, in November 1945, Chief Prosecutor Robert
Jackson gave an opening statement at Nuremberg saying "The real complaining party at your bar is
civilization." You can see the original sentence in English in the handout. It says "The real
complaining party at your bar is civilization." If you do not know English you make think that
something's drinking at a bar having a party to complain about something, but bar in this case means
the court. In the Western law, the court belongs to the judge, so that is why the prosecutors call the
court "your court" when they speak to the judge. So, the complaining party is a plaintiff, and the
word "civilization" is written with a capital C, indicating the only, the unique civilization. So,
Jackson used this term with a very strong meaning. Now, before the Tokyo Trial, this judgment of
civilization was ready in existence. For example, in the preamble of the Hague convention and also
the preamble of the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868. You can see, again, find the word
civilization. So the word civilization has always been a cliche used by the strong when they look
down on the weak. We don't know whether Keenan was aware of Jackson's statement, but his use of
the word civilization was quite shallow, superficial, but the Japanese took it seriously and tried to
examine the meaning of civilization. So, I would like to talk about some of the responses of the
Japanese. The earliest response came approximately four months after the opening statement by Mr.
Keenan. Journalist Michio Takeyama wrote "The Trial of Mr. Hyde." Michio Takeyama, I'm sure
you know his name, because he's the famous author of "Harp of Burma." "Harp of Burma" - was
that the only important piece of work that he has made? No, he was basically a journalist and also he
taught the first high school of Japan and also the liberal arts department of the University of Tokyo
so he spent a long time teaching students. And for almost 50 years he has been an active intellectual,
and during those intellectual activities, he has always dealt with the theme of the Tokyo Trial, so it
was his lifelong theme. There are certain things that I regret in my life and one of that is not having
met Michio Takeyama. So, my [...] professor was from a student of Michio Takeyama and I had the
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opportunity to be introduced to Michio Takeyama while I was studying as a post-graduate. But, I
didn't think that I was important enough to meet him and he died the next year, which was about 30
years ago. Now, let us go back to the trial of Mr. Hyde. Please look at page 6 of the handout, section
7. This is the beginning section of the book, The Trial of Mr. Hyde "One day I went to observe the
war crimes trial. On this day they were holding a special hearing, so tickets weren't necessary, and
they didn't examine personal effects, either. The defendant being examined this day had not yet been
reported by the press; there had been no photos of his face. He looked fearsome. He dominated the
dock. Talking wasn't permitted, but I whispered to the person beside me: "Who is that new
defendant?" My neighbor informed me: "Modern Civilization."" So, this is how the trial of Mr. Hyde
starts, and Takeyama himself has been to the court several times, so you could call this an allegory
based on his own experience. The prosecutor accuses the defendant, called "Modern Civilization" in
the same tone that Keenan accused the Japanese defendants. So, the leaders before or during the war
were supposed to be judged and the most important defendant is modern civilization, being held
responsible. So, Keenan talked about the battle of civilization and this book was written only four
months after, which makes it the earliest criticism of the Tokyo Trial. If this was printed at the time,
I'm sure that there would have been a strong reaction for and against, but due to GHQ's censorship,
unfortunately, this book was never published at the time. Now, all the responsibility was fixed to
modern civilization it may seem, but that is not the case within this book. He tried to analyze the
destiny of modern civilization which was never discussed at the actual court. In other words, the
duality of modern civilization. In his own expression, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. There are two faces
or a duality and he stressed the importance of understanding the duality of modern civilization. Well,
Mr. Hyde, Dr. Jekyll of course comes from Stevenson's book, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." You can
see the summary of Iwanami's book list to understand the content. So, Dr. Jekyll develops this secret
potion, and by taking this potion, he would turn himself into Mr. Hyde who is violent and aggressive,
and he continues to change form, and then the story ends in a sad way. Stevenson's book is well-
written and still read widely throughout the world. And this is now used as a representative term for
dual personality as well. Now, in a rich country, modern civilization accomplishes sublime things.
But in unfortunate countries with their various constraints, he takes the surprising form and works as
evil in the places one least expects. So that was another quote. In a rich country, modern civilization
accomplishes sublime things, which is Dr. Jekyll. And in unfortunate countries, he takes surprising
form and works as evil in unexpected placed; that's Mr. Hyde. In Japan, modern civilization
functioned as Mr. Hyde mostly, according to his argument. So, rich countries, the haves, the
unfortunate countries, not-haves. The importance of understanding the dual nature of civilization was
stressed in the form of argument by the prosecutor, and he gives the closing remark to the prosecutor.
I quote, " "Gentlemen of the Court: in this court we pass judgment in the name of civilization. We
take this as an honor, as a point of pride. We revere civilization and worship its noble side." Why,
when modern civilization appears in have-not countries does he metamorphose into Mr. Hyde?
These are not just questions of morality but people in some countries had bad attitude and refused to
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obey what in have-countries Dr. Jekyll said. It is I believe a fundamental problem and people who in
more fortunate countries who would have been spared Mr. Hyde must join in giving it thought. [...]
try to argue against Keenan in this book. If we desire perpetual true civilization, we need to
understand under which circumstances the modern civilization would turn evil. And this is an 18-
page book, it's very short. Richard Minear has translated this and now it's available in English as
well.
Mr. Hyde's trial is based on the prosecutors' closing argument and that is effectively depicting to
criticize the idea of modern civilization. So let us juxtapose those two. Keenan's statement's and Mr.
Hyde's trial's descriptions. You can understand how Takeyama has been effectively criticizing the
idea of modern civilization. That is not only limited to Mr. Hyde's trial in terms of his criticism of
the Tokyo Trial. It's also found in the history of Showa's spirit. This book is originally titled "Ten
Years After," but while he was traveling European nations, the publisher changed the title from "Ten
Years After" to "The History of the Japanese Soul in Showa." I'd like to proceed based on the
descriptions on this book. It's talking about Yoshi Takeuchi who has been a critic of [...] and also
the well-known critics of modern [...]. According to his essays in Japan and Asia, Takeuchi talked
about Takeyama as follows: the critics of the Tokyo Trial have yet to be popular and very little has
been logical but Michio Takeyama's "The History of the Japanese Soul in Showa" should be one of
them. And in that publication, there are some misconceptions but there are some ingenuities and
quite insightful thoughts. So, Takeuchi to some extent evaluates Takeyama's criticism against the
Tokyo Trial. I'd like to continue my citation from Takeyama's publications. The intention of this
publication is to juxtapose some counterarguments for the conventional ideas. In Japan, there was
some fascists but the nation itself was not fascist. That's the essence of this book. So, with these
three citations I think you can get the gist of his history of the Japanese soul in Showa. So, this was a
kind of counterargument for the conventional ideas. Before this writing was publicized, there had
been other publications on the history of Showa that drew some attention. Then, I would like to take
up how Takeuchi evaluates Takeyama's viewpoint. He's talking about his idea [...] of civilization.
Just as I cited, by agreeing to hold a trial under the name of civilization, he's also defending the false
crimes appealed to Japan. That's a kind of a misunderstanding by Takeuchi, a misconception,
because there is no such description that Takeyama has been on the side of modern civilization. But
it is clear that he is not the dichotomy or the double aspects of modern civilization. But that essence
is on the [...] of civilization. And history is just one-way traffic from one side to the other. In the
interpretation of Yoshimi Takeuchi and Judge Pal's basic standpoint has been based on the multiple
aspects of civilization. And that's one of his achievements with the publication of Japan and Asia. I'd
like to talk about one of the defendants, Shigenori Togo, who was the foreign minister at the time of
the end of the war. But I'm not talking about Togo as the critics of the judgment of civilization but
I'd like to talk about what he wrote after the Tokyo Trial, because his priority was to do some tactics
so as to preserve his honor and the foreign ministry's honor. After given the sentence for 20 years'
imprisonment, he wrote one aspect of time in his memoir. But this was not a simple memoir. In the
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preamble, it goes like this, and please refer to the material #8, the first citation, the purpose of this
book is not my autobiography. This is not my excuse for myself. This is not to excuse the Japanese
government conduct. But it was simply to describe what I had seen in the past times and I'd like to
put some civilization observations for what I have seen and for what I have done. So he declares that
he is observing the trend of the time. It sounds quite sophisticated, even though he was writing this
book in the [...] prison. So, I think this depicts how he has been excellent as a civilization critic. He
was formerly a diplomat. He graduated from the seventh former high school and also studied at the
Tokyo Imperial College. His major was German literature, so he learned foreign cultures. After
joining the ministry of foreign affairs, he had a chance to work abroad. And up to 1941, for his
assumption of the foreign minister, he worked Magden, Switzerland, Germany and US, and then
Germany once again, and Moscow, the former Soviet Union. It's quite interesting because his
publication is full of his observations based on his exposure to the non-Japanese cultures. For
example, his impression with his first visit to the US. And please refer to the following quotation:
coming to the US with the high [...] of freedom and that's so refreshing. I was surprised to see a
skyscraper and I was amazed at the mechanical civilization progress. So, he knew how the US has
been powerful back in those times, so it's quite easy to imagine that Togo has already understood
what extent of progress the US has made. And for US-Japan relationships, his basic idea is for the
one side challenges the other, the other reacts, the reaction leading to another challenge, so that's a
back-and-forth challenge and response. It is something like Toynbee's view of history. If you try to
only Japan just based on the relations between the US because the Tokyo Trial's focus was only on
the past so there was no discussion for the challenge-reaction-challenge relations. But Togo wrote
that point in his publications. He talked about disarmament, treaties for navies, and the establishment
of the axis relations, and the US assistance to Cheng Kai-shek, and he deepens his discussions for the
challenge-reaction-challenge. After the triple pact, the US started to denounce the Japanese attitude
after the Manchurian Incident. That caused a challenge and generated a Japanese reaction that led to
the US challenge that was the source of the failure of the US-Japan negotiations for the
commencement of the Pacific war. That's the basic stance of Togo, the source of the Pacific war.
And another aspect is found in his reference to the technologies. After resigning, the foreign minister
[...] he said like this: Scientific is an often used term while Japan has been talking about Japan
fought based on the individual courage; that's the source of the failure. Judgment of civilization, how
that challenged the Japanese reaction and that reaction caused another challenge by the allied powers.
So, that is how they have continued the discussions on judgment of civilization. And that's in the
exposures to the Western cultures since the Meiji restoration. I'd like to talk about that point quite
briefly and I'd like to close my presentation. And Yukichi Fukuzawa was one of the lecturers based
on Western cultures and he talked about his definitions of civilization, civilized, semi-civilized and
barbarous. And after twenty years, at the time of the Japan-Sino war, and Mutsu Munemitsu, the
foreign minister at that time, he referred to representing the Western civilization and preserving
Asian civilization. That's the confrontation of the Japan-Sino war [...] and Western culture [...] is
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Japan and Asian former civilization was China at that time. After, Japan used to adore Western
cultures, but took a challenge against Western countries in the Pacific war, and Japan had discussions
on civilization. In other words, Japan has always been civilization-conscious in the context of history.
In Japan, there are boys' name "Fumiaki" based on civilization. So, Japan has always been
civilization-conscious and that's also found in Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and
that was highly evaluated by the japan comparative studying societies, the special features. So, the
high civilization consciousness was found in the Japanese thought, so I'd like to propose my
hypothesis that at the outset of the Tokyo Trial, there was a source of discussion for the trial of
civilizations. That concludes my presentation. Thank you.
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Good afternoon. Thank you for coming or coming back if you were here this morning. I would
also like to begin by thanking Kokushikan Daigaku for putting on this important symposium and
President Miura, President Shinohara, and especially my friend Professor Ikeda who I'm happy to
say is an alumnus of Georgetown University; we're very proud of him. I would also like to thank all
of the organizations involved in supporting the symposium: Sankei Shimbun, Shimonaka Memorial
Zaidan, the Military Historical Association and the Association for the Response or Control of Crises
in Japan.
So, let me begin by giving you my sense of the Tokyo Trial and nationalism in postwar Japan. As
Professor David Reynolds of Cambridge University recently reminded us, there are two kinds of
nationalism that have competed for the hearts and minds of people at least since the beginning of the
20th century. One nationalism, which is based on the civic nation, signified a community of laws,
institutions and citizenship within a defined territory. The other nationalism is based on the idea of an
ethnic nation, which is defined by a community of shared dissent rooted in language, ethnicity and
culture. John Hutchinson further clarifies the distinction. According to him, the ideal of civic
nationalism is a civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores, like the polis of
classical antiquity. It is a cosmopolitan rationalist conception of the nation. By contrast, for anethnic
nationalist, nations are primordial expressions of the spirit, like families, or natural solidarities.
Unlike the civic nationalist, the ethnic nationalist founds the nation not on mere consent or law but
on the passions implanted in nature, in history. There are slight differences in terminology between
Reynolds and Hutchinson but their common distinction between these two forms of nationalism is
clear and helpful.
Some academics have criticized this distinction as unstable, along with all binary oppositions, but
the most useful of these criticisms has not rejected the distinction completely. It merely points to the
way in which all nations are internally contested sites where both civic nationalism and ethnic
nationalism compete for the hearts and minds of the citizens of the national state. Rivalry between
these competing forms of nationalism has been true in the case of Japanese nationalism, as the work
of Takekawa Shunichi, James Patrick Boyd, Curtis Gayle, Oguma Eiji and many others demonstrates.
In Japanese language, kokumin shugi and minzoku shugi are not only conceptually distinct but
they have distinct histories, kokumin shugi or civic nationalism arose first in the early Meiji period
during the debate over a constitution and the idea of citizenship. It sought to define the Japanese in
legal terms as citizens, i.e., as those people who are legally considered members of the new nation
and are subjects of the constitutional monarch. Minzoku shugi or ethnic nationalism arose a few years
later in reaction to what was thought to be Western legalism embodied in the norms of citizenship
and civic nationalism. Neither form of nationalism, it should be emphasized, was officially
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recognized during imperial Japan, even though various intellectuals, politicians, bureaucrats and
others promoted one form of nationalism or the other, sometimes both, in the fluid political
conditions of imperial Japan.
Now I believe that the political and cultural legacy of the Tokyo war crimes trial can best be
understood in the context of civic and ethnic nationalism vying for influence in the postwar years.
This is evident in those more recent studies that have adopted what I call the indirect or neo-
objective approach to the Tokyo Trial. This neo-objective approach looks at the effects of the trial
less in terms of a direct critique or defense of, the soundness of its legal practice and principles and
more in terms of the trial's influence on subsequent political values, intellectual legacies and
international relations. Among the finest examples of this neo-objectivist approach is the work of two
of the people who join me in the symposium today: Professor Higurashi Yoshinobu's Tokyo Saiban,
and Professor Ushimura Kei's Bunmei no Sabaki wo Koete.
I agree with Professor Ushimura's important point that the Tokyo Trial presented the Japanese
with a framework for reconstructing identity after the war. I simply wish to explore in more detail
what kind of identity. And I believe that the best answer will come from a reconsideration of the
legacy of the Tokyo Trial in the context of the framework of civic and ethnic nationalisms as
competing forces in shaping the postwar Japanese identity. The end of multi-ethnic imperial Japan
was the precondition.
Nationalism rather than imperialism is the basic framework for Japanese identity after the war.
General MacArthur tried to impose both individualism and a concept of the civic nation, kokumin,
through a constitution in which, as the preamble states, the civic nation, kokumin, not the monarch,
declares itself to be sovereign. Article 10 of the new 1946-47 constitution made it quite clear that
"The requirements for being a Japanese kokumin are determined by law." Here is a clear reminder of
the important relationship between law and the civic nation. Nonetheless, at the same time, the
decolonization of Japanese society meant that in the early immediate postwar years, Japan saw the
rise of ethnic nationalism in practice more so than it did MacArthur's ideal of civic nationalism.
Decolonization alone, however, cannot fully explain why the values of civic nationalism faltered in
the early decades of postwar Japan. Ethnic homogeneity does not require a people to accept ethnic
national values or norms. In fact, most studies show that civic nationalism is on the rise in Japan
today, even a Japan that is largely ethnically homogeneous. My contention is that the effects of the
Tokyo Trial played a role in undermining the norms that lie at the heart of civic nationalism. That's
what I hope to demonstrate below.
Certainly, the image of a more mono-ethnic Japan in the early postwar years alighted those who
had been intoning ethnic nationalism for and during the war. We must not forget that a formative
element of ethnic nationalism is the rejection of legalism or the rule of law as a foreign Western
cultural constructs. One of the clearest expressions of this anti-legalism in Japanese ethnic
nationalism was that of Uchida Ryohei. Uchida wrote, in the guiding principles of the Amur River
society, that there was a deep connection between what he called the "Asian ethnic nations," ajia
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minzoku, and their resistance, legalism. His rejection of the rule of law as merely a Western cultural
concept and his call instead for pan-Asianism was echoed in the way many Japanese received
prominent dissent from the bench by the only Asian justice, Judge Radhabinod Pal of India.
Ironically, Pal's dissent was based on legal principles, not a blanket endorsement of Japan's wartime
conduct or even a pan-Asian sentiment on his part. But at his dissent slowly became known to the
Japanese, especially after 1952 when the censorship was lifted, as Professor Ushimura has shown,
Pal's view was seen as coming unmistakably from a non-Westerner. In short, Pal's critique of the
Western Orientalism of the Tokyo Trial could be and was reincorporated into a domestic form of
Japanese Orientalism that increasingly saw law and the courts as merely ploys for power, void of any
universal principle ofjustice.
Now an important precedent to this utilitarian view of law was set by Watsuji Tetsuro, late in the
war years, when he distinguished between the excellence of the Japanese ethnic nation, minzoku no
yushosei, and the inferiority of the American civic nationality, Amerika no kokuminsei. Watsuji
argued that this Anglo-Saxon idea of kokumin identity was morally suspect, as it was merely a
combination of Francis Bacon's utilitarianism and Thomas Hobbes' use of a theory of natural law to
justify base desires. Japan, in contrast, which he felt had a sense of primordial ethnic identity, was
praised for its superior moral virtues as far back as the 16th century by none other than St. Francis
Xavier. Now, if the Japanese people in the midst of the hunger of the postwar years did not
immediately recall Watsuji's argument when the Tokyo Trial had ended, just four years after he
published it, Iwanami Shoten republished Watsuji's work in 1962 and again in 1963. Surely it was
Watsuji's combination of utilitarianism and a cynical rejection of the natural law as merely covers for
Americans justifying their rapacious desires that echoed strongly in the aftermath of the verdicts of
the Tokyo Trial. Watsuji's views were thus implanted in this broader rivalry between civic
nationalism, kokumin shugi, and ethnic nationalism, minzoku shugi, in postwar Japan. Watsuji's
harsh view of civic nationality as the nationality of the enemy resonated before and after the Tokyo
Trial as a stinging indictment of the universal principles of law and justice that the Tokyo Trial had
loudly proclaimed but which they were widely seen as failing to enact fairly and objectively.
Another unexpected source that undermined the legal values of civic nationalism was Kawashima
Takeyoshi's 1967 legal consciousness of the Japanese people, nihonjin no houishiki. I say
unexpected because Kawashima's intent was of course to encourage more legal consciousness,
particularly more participation in civil lawsuits by the Japanese people. One might expect such a
position to be consistent with civic nationalism, but two things contributed to at least an implicit
ethnic nationalism that underlay Kawashima's argument. First, is the incredible lack of any reference
by him to the Tokyo Trial, as he chronicled the legal consciousness of postwar Japanese. Second is
Kawashima's positivist definition of law. According to Kawashima, law or legislation is the
expression of a certain ideology or way of thinking about how to exercise political power. Of course,
Kawashima's legal positivism may also be seen in his famous argument that, Japanese society had
retained a pre-modern element that was at odds with the modern legal codes Japan had been forced
63
to adopt from the West. And while Kawashima himself spoke optimistically as a modernist of the
inevitable dissolution of this pre-modern legal consciousness which he saw that as dissolving and
going away in time, one can catch an indirect glimpse of the legacy of the Tokyo Trial in the
following statement he made about the relationship of law and a particular social basis.
"Even if one makes law, if that law doesn't actually have a sufficient
foundation within a society, this thing believed to be law will not
carried out very often in reality and sometimes not at all—which means
it won't play its function ofregulating social life. And even ifa law is
"carried out," the manner in which it is carried out will also bear on
whether it has a foundation in that society "
Clearly, the Tokyo Trial implemented law that was effectively carried out in Japan. Thus, the more
important question Kawashima raised was in what manner was it carried out. The answer for
Kawashima cannot be derived from whether or not the Tokyo Trial expressed laws as, justice and
truth. He believed law is about neither justice nor truth; law is merely an expression of political
power and social control. The only issue by extension of his logic is whether the power implemented
through the Tokyo Trial had a foundation in Japanese society. And once the question is posed thus, it
is hard to conclude that the Tokyo Trial was consistent with those supposed Japanese mores.
Moreover, Kawashima's basic view of the courts is that they are simply a place to resolve conflict.
This perspective offers little as to whether the courts can be expected to render justice rather than
merely victory for whomever has the most power in society. And that's the main point about
Kawashima's thesis on the Japanese people's legal consciousness in terms of the legacy of the Tokyo
Trial in civil nationalism. Civic nationalism requires that for the law to be legitimate it must be more
than a tool for the resolution of conflict; it must be an expression ofjustice. Certainly, Kawashima's
belief in the continuity of pre-modern social mores in modern Japan blinds his jurisprudence with the
primordial and parochial nationalism of minzoku. But his cynicism about law as something other
than a theory of universal justice and his emphasis on social or cultural relativism as the deciding
element in the applicability of law also suggests a subtle element of ethnic nationalism even within
Kawashima's modernist legal thinking.
Next, let's consider the implications for postwar Japanese nationalism of Takeyama Michio's
rejection of rational individualism. I turn to Takeyama's letter to Judge Roling which Professor
Ushimura rightly describes as important in terms of the historiography of the Tokyo Trial within
Japan. Takeyama confessed that when, before the war, the concept of minzoku was introduced in the
context of the rising fascism in Europe, there was a reaction among Japanese intellectuals that it was
despicable to even utter such an idea as minzoku. Yet in reflecting on the Tokyo Trial, whose verdict
Takeyama strongly opposed, he abandoned the individual responsibility that lay at the heart of civic
nationalism and moved haltingly but decisively towards a more accepting stance regarding minzoku
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shugi and especially the moral collectivism it presumes. "I had long believed," Takeyama confessed
"that responsibility and retribution should only be based on the conscience of the individual. . . But
through the experience of the war, I have painfully come to feel that there are facts that cannot be
easily resolved from the position of the conscience of the individual. What I mean is that we cannot
avoid the whole question of evil. That is, whether we are a kokumin or whether we are a minzoku,
we must accept the sins committed by the group to which we belong as our own sin. . . . Actually,
even children cannot escape this condition." "Whether we are a kokumin or whether we are a
minzoku,"-- in adopting such an indifferent attitude toward what is the essential point, Takeyama
reveals his inclination toward ethnic nationalism. An indifference to the distinction between ethnic or
civic nationalism is the chief characteristic of all ethnic nationalists. For civic nationalists, the
distinction is crucial. In addition, when Takeyama argues for the collective responsibility for sin,
even that of children who may not have been born when the sin happened, he revealed an
understanding of the relationship of the individual and nation that has much more in common with
ethnic nationalism than it does with civic nationalism. For an ethnic nationalist, one is born into a
community of collective responsibility. For a civic nationalist, one may enter or leave the community
through a legal process. Takeyama's ethnic nationalist critique of the Tokyo Trial contrasts nicely
with that of Saiki Keishi. At first glance, Saiki's position seems identical to that of Takeyama. Saiki
too rejected the radical postwar individualism that claimed no responsibility for the earlier
generation's war, but not because he believed the sins of the father are necessarily visited on the son.
Rather, he sought to highlight the central feature of postwar Japanese liberalism as being the false
choice between either "the state alone is responsible" or "the individual alone is responsible" in
either case, leaving no room for legitimate civic responsibility. Saiki's consistent effort was to
reexamine this divide and to turn attention to the importance of the state rather than the ethnic
community for democratic political life. A key part of Saiki's effort was renewing attention to the
legacy of war responsibility and particularly the role of the Tokyo Trial in shaping that legacy. Saiki
argued that the Tokyo Trial verdict, which held certain individuals responsible for what was after all
state policy, merely strengthened the ideal of individual responsibility that then developed into an
ideology of rejecting the legitimacy of all forms of social collectivity including civil society. This
was the face of postwar Japanese liberalism. But Saiki countered that:
"Japan's case is different from that of Nazi Germany. Don't the Japanese people themselves know better
than anyone that the locus of responsibility [for the war] cannot be entirely laid at the feet of class-A war
criminals. If it is a matter of taking responsibility [for the war], it cannot be limited to class-A war
criminals but has to be shared by all the members of the civic nation. . . . And that is why, on the one
hand, there has been such deep-rooted distrust of the Tokyo Trial. . . . What really should have been asked
was how should we understand the state as the main bearer of responsibility [for the war]? We are still
under the influence of the evil spell of this unresolved problem."
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Against this individualistic, almost anarchic liberalism, Saiki emphasized the need for civic
nationalism, political form of the national collective. His support for civic nationalism is clear in his
return to Thomas Hobbes and in particular to Hobbes' recognition of the positive influence of
religion in restraining the power of the sovereign. Consequently, Saiki strongly criticized the extreme
secularism of postwar Japan that rejected religious communities and the idea of a Being who
transcended the individual. Saiki did not dally with ethnic tribalism by implying Shintoism as the
only religion for the Japanese people. He noted that religiosity in some sense is essential for civic life
and that the significance of religion for democracy cannot be dismissed simply as a question of the
separation of Church and State, the way liberals often do. He held that the important principle of
freedom of religion for civic democracy is not freedom from religion but rather the opposite. . ..
"freedom of religion aims at the freedom of religions (various religions), to put down roots in the
midst of civil society." In short, Saiki defended the idea that all religions were at home in Japan as
long as they were not antagonistic to the principles of civic society. More decisively, he wrote that
what postwar Japan needed was a recognition of a Transcendental Being to which the individual and
the nation wereaccountable. This Transcendental Being, inseparable from religion, was the defining
feature of Saiki's critique of the cynical liberalism that resulted from the Tokyo Trial verdict. It was
also his hope for the future of Japanese democracy.
The indefensible verdicts of the Tokyo Trial, coming as they did at a formative period in the
rebuilding of Japan, had a strongly negative impact on postwar Japanese democratic values in two
interrelated ways. First, the unjust verdicts undermined respect for the law as an expression of
universal justice and moral truth. If this was justice as the West saw it, then perhaps Watsuji Tetsuro
was right in condemning the Natural Law and civic nationalism as merely pretenses for the West's
vanities and lust for power. But if so, what was left? An embrace of primordial tradition and ethnicity
as defining national identity? No. History has afforded all of us choice of nationalisms. Either civic
nationalism premised on universal reason and the rule of law or ethnic nationalism premised on
passions implanted by nature and history. It is certainly understandable that many Japanese became
cynical after the Tokyo Trial verdicts and why this cynicism frequently sought refuge in the embrace
of ethnic nationalism. This was particularly so given both the anti-Westernism of much of Japanese
ethnic nationalism and the fact that the sole dissent came from the Indian Judge Pal. In addition, a
cynical attitude toward any transcendental principle of Truth that the injustice of the Tokyo Trial had
invited led to the rampant secularism of postwar Japan. The secularism shared deeply in a distrust of
any religious claim to transcendental Truth even as it conformed neatly with the ethnic nationalism
of postwar Japan's Marxist and leftist movements for whom anti-Westernism largely meant anti-
America.
But there has been a counter-narrative, as Saiki Keishi's works attest. This counter-narrative seeks
to strengthen civic nationalism (including religious pluralism) as a framework within which one can
search for the True, the Good and the Beautiful. And civic nationalism understands, as ethnic
nationalism seems not to, the old maxim "abusus non tollit usum" - Latin for "the abuse of a thing
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does not preclude its proper use." The fact that the Tokyo Trial abused the Truth does not mean that
the Truth does not exist or that we are exempted from our human obligation to see it out, wherever













































































































































































































































































































































































Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your introduction. My name is Ikeda of the
faculty of politics and law of Kokushikan University. Today, we are having a symposium on the
Tokyo Trial.
We have planned quite hard for holding this symposium, centering around Professor Shinohara.
And today we face such a highly sophisticated international conference. And also it's a great honor
of mine to speak in front of all of you and within honored guests. And one of the people of the
faculty of the law who worked hard for this presentation, and next year we are going to face 70th
anniversary after the end of the Pacific war and the 66th anniversary of the adjournment of the Tokyo
Trial. They are not the only reasons for this symposium. As Professor Osten talked about, he visited
his library when he was writing a doctorate essay, because the library of Kokushikan University is
quite wonderful, far better than that of the University of Tokyo in terms of the documents or
materials for the Tokyo Trial.
When the government had to decide which university should be the owner of the main materials
and documents for the Tokyo Trial, a professor at that time made the greatest effort to invite those
libraries to Kokushikan University. Today, we have Mr. Kotaro Hirota, who was one of the class-A
war criminals and executed in the Tokyo Trial and we also have Mr. Kazuhiko Togo who is the
former ambassador. And we have the two gentlemen's presence and Togo's materials for the criminal
defense. Many of them have not been disclosed. They have yet to be disclosed to the public and there
are so many things we should do that the fact that Kokushikan University has been the owner of so
much of the documents related to the Tokyo Trial of this symposium.
Today, we have the honor to have the pleasure of Mr. Mike Mochizuki from George Washington
University which is named after the first president. He was one of the government staff for the
Clinton administration and probably one of the most reliable Americans seen from the perspective of
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Professor Doak and Prime Minister Abe even depicting Professor Doak
who is much closer to the Japanese than the real Japanese. And we also have Professor Takahashi
and Professor Yamamoto to present. And those two are also the forefront for the studies of the Tokyo
Trial. And I'm not an expert on Tokyo Trial, so I'd like to talk about how the Tokyo Trial has affected
the postwar Japanese foreign policy and I'd like to finish within 30 minutes so as not to be scolded
by Professor Shinohara, so that's what I'm going to do for the next 25 minutes. I'd like to stick to the
prepared script for the sake of the translators and I'd like to proceed with my presentation.
The object of my presentation is to review how the trial of the international military tribunal for
the Far East, or the Tokyo Trial, affected the postwar Japanese diplomacy and foreign policies. But
for this aim, first thing for us to do is to analyze the basic points of the US policy for the occupation
of postwar Japan. Secondly, focusing on the change in the US occupation policy after the outbreak of
the cold war between the United States and the former Soviet Union, how had the US changed its
policy to face the cold war? Thirdly, I will describe the US occupation policy for Japan in
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comparison with the characteristics of the occupation policy for Germany, the country with which
Japan allied to fight World War II. Then, I'd like to compare the political tactics and the difference
between Shigeru Yoshida and Konrad Adenauer, because their different political positions and tactics
actually resulted in the considerable difference and influence on the postwar foreign policies in those
two countries.
And first, how the US came up with the occupation policy for Japan after World War II. On July
26, 1945, the allied powers issued the Potsdam Declaration, that's the instrument to lead to Japan to
surrender in the Pacific war. But this Potsdam Declaration bears quite important meanings for
postwar Japan. Article 6 of the Potsdam Declaration states: until the irresponsible militarism has
been completely removed from Japan, we should make the best efforts to eliminate all of the rights
and powers of those people who have deceived the Japanese citizens to drive concurrency of the
world, and then lead to the policies to punish all of the war criminals. And that was centering around
GHQ including the dismantling of the former Japanese army and navy.
And Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration, as it says, severe punishment should be imposed on
war criminals. That is why the Tokyo Trial was held. And to punish war criminals. As you know
quite well, after the war, on September 2, on Tokyo Bay, on board the USS Missouri, General
MacArthur, the supreme commander of the allied powers, and foreign ministry Shigemitsu signed
the instrument of surrender and Japan formally accepted the declaration on the same day US
President Truman issued General Order No. 1 by which he announced what is generally called the
three D's initial policy for the post-surrender of Japan.
Then, he initiated the US policy for the Japanese disarmament, demilitarization and
democratization of Japan through the dissolution of its army, navy and the arrest of the war criminals
including some severe punishment for the war criminals. In his memoir, General MacArthur also
stated that his intention was to take measures as required to dissolve Japan's armed forces and
extinguish any other war capabilities of Japan to carry out this promise. So, the most important of the
US occupation policy is to provide the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, and for
that aim, MacArthur reflected the ideas into Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. That formed the
Japanese Constitution characteristics of the permanent renouncement of war. But for six years of the
occupation and their policies were not so steadfast because their primary aim was to provide
demilitarization and democracy, but US ideas and attitudes had been changed gradually. But
punishing the war criminals and making Japan powerless has not been changed.
As you know quite well, on December 23rd of 1948, that falls upon our current emperor's birthday,
seven war criminals including Hideki Tojo were executed by hanging. And the verdict said that in all
of the warfare from the Manchurian Incident to the Pacific war was solely intended to conquer and
control east and south Asia, and that warfare was a war of aggression based on joint conspiracy. In
other words, the Japanese conduct in the war, everything was evil, so it was actually a one-way
verdict as the victor's judgment. So by planting the sense of guilt onto Japan, like Professor Doak
talked about, and that led to the self-criticism of Japanese peoples and the Japanese view of history,
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and that is to suppress nationalism which was supposed to be hazardous to Japanese democracy.
That type of idea had been driven out from Japanese textbooks and in a sense that might have
Japanese education go aground in a sense. And some people say that the Tokyo Trial view of history
has been utilized commercially and in the postwar education and the Japanese teachers association
had started to take the powers and to undermine the Japanese people's pride and Japanese's people's
souls and spirits, and the Japanese people's traditions, in a way.
But in the beginning of the cold war, the US had to change their basic policies for the Japanese
occupation. Sir Winston Churchill witnessing the expansion of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe
warned the United States that the cold war has already begun in his speech delivered on March 5,
1964, from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the
continent. In the US, based on the theoretical development by George Kennan, long telegraph and his
article titled the source of soviet conduct, President Truman declared a policy called Truman
Doctrine.
And clarifying the United Nations' anti-communist and anti-Soviet approach as the main US
policies against the former Soviet Union including containment of the Soviet Union. And back in
1984, January the 7th, the secretary of army declared a shift in the US occupation policy in his
statement made in San Francisco. The objective of the US policy for the occupation of Japan is to
foster the country into a democratic state with a strong and stable self-supporting economy so that
Japan will serve as a deterrent force against the threat of a war or a threat of the Soviet Union's.
George Kennan came up with the recommendation 13/2 and he also talked about fundamental
change in the focus of the US occupation policy from the initial phase of punishment and reform to
the new phase to rebuild and foster Japan as a member of the democratic camp.
That is George Kennan's presentation of the basic framework for the transformation of American
policy toward Japan. Subsequently, in the Far East, the communist government led by Mao Tse-tung
in China on October 1st, 1949, then drove Cheng Kai-shek's party out of the mainland to Taiwan.
And on June 25th of next year, the Korean War broke out in the Korean peninsula invasion of the
North Korean army assisted by the Soviet Union across the 38th parallel north. This promoted the
independence of Japan. As you are aware of, John Foster Dulles, American representative, was
suggested the possibility of Japan being remilitarized in front from Shigeru Yoshida. However, at that
time, Yoshida rejected the idea of Dulles, because of the following reasons.
Because Japan is not equipped with enough economic muscles to cope with remilitarization.
Another reason is that there's a psychological basis in support of remilitarization has been lost from
Japanese people's thought. The third is that the defeat in war has left a number of traumatic scars on
people. So Yoshida placed a major importance on economic recovery and reconstruction. Later on,
this is what he call the Yoshida Doctrine, which placed the highest priority on the recovery of the
Japanese economy. It became Japan's postwar foreign policy.
Now, let's take a look at a comparison to Germany's situation. As you are aware, Germany was an
allied nation for Japan as part of the tripartite pact during the war. However, there seems to be a
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major difference between the two countries although both went for trials after the war. The
occupation policy characteristics-wise, the first difference is that, in Japan there was an occupation
by the US forces, solely by US occupation, whereas in Germany, there was a division of East and
West Germany, and even the capital Berlin was divided by four countries: US, UK, France and
Soviet Union.
The second major difference is that Japan's occupation was indirect occupation whereas Germany,
it was direct rule by the military section. The third difference is, under the direction of the United
States is Japan was quite established, quite an early independence as the cold war was progression,
and Germany still it took them some time for decision making as a divided nation, so that is why
they became dependent later than Japan. In both countries, Germany and Japan, there are several
differences in terms of constitution and security. As we see the process of formulation of the
constitution, Japan's Constitution is based upon imposition and then rooted in MacArthur draft that
was created by the occupational forces. And then this is to eliminate the emperor from the direct
involvement in politics by placing the emperor as a symbol of Japan, and so that would lead to a
renunciation of war and then abolishment of feudal privileges, so that is real strong, that intention by
MacArthur in terms of policy toward Japan.
Meanwhile, West Germany, they started constitutional conference and through their democratic
procedures they created documents and then the [...] basic law for the federal republic of Germany
was established. So, whereas Japan's Constitution was called the "Constitution of Japan," in West
Germany, in an effort to emphasize that it is a tentative effort grand low well instead of constitution.
And so the second major difference is that the Japanese Constitution, as you see in the preamble and
Article 9, it condemns the past behavior of Japan. It has a very constant political thought based upon
the social democracy in the New Deal-type and more of an idealistically approach that was rooted in
the 1930s in the United States. Meanwhile, West Germany because of the real rigorous cold war
confrontation, because of the logical changes in Europe, the basis of its activities on liberalism and
conservatism in order to protect themselves against incursion or aggression of totalitarian idea of a
communist.
Furthermore, in the area of security, Japan adopted idealistic pacifism or demilitarization in
Article 9 of its constitution. West Germany was fully aware of international rigorous situation based
upon the geopolitical weaknesses, they were already for the potential rearmament in the future. Japan
geopolitically is surrounded by the ocean. That is a difference between Japan and Germany in terms
of how geopolitically Germany is more prone to the crisis such as Berlin crisis in 1948 and also the
crisis of the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and being under
the threat of communism.
And so the difference is based upon, when Shigeru Yoshida and Konrad Adenauer in terms of
their political style and characteristics, so the basic stance of Yoshida is to accept the occupational
policy as it is candidly and then to fall in line with Douglas MacArthur. Japan became independent as
they reconstructed their economy. So this is called Yoshida Line and later on Yoshida Doctrine. And
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then, in September, 1951, at the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan that was signed in the city, at
the same time, US-Japan security treaty was signed. Japan's security is based upon this despite the
fact that Yoshida is aware that this treaty is quite unequal. Still, Japan's security should be protected,
dependent on the United States and Japan as a junior partner.
Yoshida didn't oppose the verdict of the Tokyo Trial and then accepted that verdict according to
Article 11 of the San Francisco treaty. Meanwhile, Adenauer, facing the US-Soviet Union
confrontation and especially the time of Korean War in 1950, then the countries started paramilitary
organization 150,000-strong, the federal policy army was established. Moving onto the restoration of
sovereignty, with the collaboration from the state secretary Dulles, the effort bore fruit. Then the
Paris Conference, ascension to NATO and also the western European union. So the self-tormenting
view of history as a result of the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, and then Japan's diplomacy at that time
was led by Shigeru Yoshida.
So, the Yoshida Doctrine was presented or negative asset to the diplomacy of Japan after the war.
Then there's a national debate on the confrontation centering around Article 9 of the Constitution's
implementation or interpretation despite the fact that many of the Japanese nationals were supportive
of the remilitarization potential, and Yoshida disregarded this type of opinion polls conducted by
NHK after the Korean War. Then there was a small number of choices available for Yoshida because
the country lost everything as a result of war.
And then the second point I'd like to make is that in Japan in 1951 and the occupation policy after
the war and then was embedded into the subjection to the United States in terms of the system. So, at
the ratification of the treaty, we have to recognize that Yoshida document based upon Dulles' request
and Chinese policy, and we have to approve the comment or the nationalist party in Taiwan. It's like
under the spell of the United States, Japanese diplomacy cannot operate on its own.
The point is that the Tokyo Trial brought about self-tormenting historical view to Japan, so it's a
very delicate situation in East Asia especially in terms of our relationship with China and South
Korea. We have to flatter those two countries and it's built on a glass castle. This idea forced Japan to
keep apologizing and to use flattery towards those countries. The verdict issued by the Tokyo Trial
brought about a lot of [...] losses in the postwar Japan's diplomacy, also hindering the prosperity and








































































































The Censorship System of GHQ
I was in Beijing until yesterday. Due to the polluted air, you cannot enjoy my beautiful voice
today, I'm afraid. I do apologize for my hoarse voice today. I was speaking to researchers who are
researching China and one of them said "I have read your book, Dr. Yamamoto, and it makes us
proud." And I asked why. He said that during the occupation, Japan underwent very stringent
censorship, much worse than that of China. The US is highlighting the severity of the censorship,
criticizing the censorship by the Chinese government, but in fact, during the occupation, the US was
conducting censorship which was much more stringent than what the Chinese government is doing.
That's what the US did to Japan. And he said he learned that from my writing. So, today, since I'm
not an expert on the Tokyo Trial, what I would like to do is look at the process or the time of the
Tokyo Trial and how the United States was conducting censorship, how the whole system was
devised and implemented. And in this way, I hope to show you how the public opinion was guided
based on this censorship plan and system. Now, I would like to show you a very complicated chart to
begin with. If you could refer to the handout, page 9-11. And these materials are available in English
and you can find a map as well as a diagram; these are the original source documents. I have
translated these documents into Japanese but since this is an international symposium, I've decided
to bring the source document for your referral. This is a diagram, page 9, it shows CCD, Civil
Censorship Detachment. CCD stands for Civil Censorship Detachment. This is the Civil Censorship
bureau or agency, sometimes when it is translated into Japanese. And these CCD offices were
established throughout Japan. In 1946, June, this was the situation. And you can see district 1, which
was Tokyo or East Japan, and district 2 covered Osaka, Nagoya and district 3 covered Fukuoka or
was located in Fukuoka should I say. This was the censorship structure. As you can see on the right-
hand side, there is a legend. Postal censorship, that was also included, and "tele" means
telecommunications, censorship of telecommunication, and then "PPB - this was media censorship,
and "TOS" stood for "technical operation section." From postal and media censorship, secret
information is gathered by TOS and the TOS does the follow-up or the following investigations. This
was the structure for the censorship. In terms of censorship as well as media research, I have been
mostly focused on PPB. I could say that the only research was done for PPB, PPB stands for "Press,
Pictorial, and Broadcast." Pictorial refers to movies or anything picture-related. Broadcasting is of
course TV and radio. Now, I realized that my research was missing the most important piece, which
was the postal censorship and also telecommunications. The research into the communications
department was lacking; that's what I began to find out recently. In terms of communications, the
most important was censorship into the postal services. However, I've been neglecting that aspect of
this whole picture. At the age of 74, for the first time in my life, after 50 years of research, I realized
that this huge piece was missing, which is an embarrassing thing to confess to you. And so, just
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recently, I started looking into the materials, documents for postal censorship. The next one, page 10,
shows the flowchart for the postal censorship. And again, this was identified among the American
documents. This was a huge diagram, and I just copied the center portion of this big document. The
idea is the posts were censored in this manner. So there are local post offices and then hub post
offices, for example, in East Japan, Tokyo central post office would gather and collect all the posts,
and that's about 3% of the total. And on the top right of this diagram, you can see the leg of this lady,
so this person is working at the desk and conducting the flashing. So this is basically comparing
against the watch list. The watch list is actually closely related to the issue of the Tokyo Trial, so war
criminals and potential war criminals, based on GHQ's policy, there would be a watch list for
important persons for whom they had to collect the postal information such as the address and name.
This is the first step, flashing. Then, once something is identified, the flow would continue to the
right. Those that did not appear on the watch list, again, for GHQ this was a very important type of
information, so you go lower in this diagram to the third row. And on the left you can see a whole
group of people at the same desk. On the far-left, you can see the business section, which was in
charge of information that was addressed to corporations or information that is basically economy-
related. And in the middle you can see the personal section. This section was responsible for opening
posts from an individual to another individual. And next to that, to the right, we can see another
section that was responsible for war criminals or people with potential problems who might or might
not be on the watch list. So, there were three main sections, and in the Tokyo post office, they
occupied the second and third floor of the post office, housing approximately 1,000 people working
everyday checking the posts. Many Japanese people were employed for extremely detailed
investigation. And that was the main body of their work. Now, in terms of handling of the watch list,
if the name is already identified from the watch list, the letter will not be opened. The envelope will
stay closed and sent to another section where they would apply steam to open the letter secretly and
then information would be obtained and the envelope would be closed again. Without leaving a trace
of opening the envelope, the post would be finally sent to the receiver. However, there were many
letters that were opened with a pair of scissors or a knife and then just taped up which clearly
indicated the fact that CCD had opened the envelope, because the tape would say the name of CCD.
And a high percentage of Tokyo residents had to go through this process. In other words, they
received many letters every day that had been opened by the censorship organization. It's closed with
this vinyl tape which was not widely available in Japan at the time. And that really surprised people,
but this was done for the purpose of censors for MacArthur. In other words, by looking at these
letters, they formulated a public opinion tally which is right here, which I brought with me, I don't
know if it's in your handout, but anyway he wanted to understand public opinion, and the reason
MacArthur decided to make people go through so many letters, well, it began with the investigation
into rightwing or Unit 731; it started as a collection of intelligence for those specific people or
groups, and then they wanted to understand how general Japanese people felt about the current
administration as well as the occupation, so they decided to take statistics by opening these letters.
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And a summary report was sent to MacArthur twice a month on a regular basis. So, postal censorship
was the means for MacArthur to obtain necessary information. That's how the system was
constructed. Towards the end of the Tokyo Trial, December 1948, when the verdict was given, just
after 12 months, CCD would cease to exist, but I was listening to the presentations today and
thinking that CCD continued to exist but they had to reduce the budget. CCD hired somewhere
between 15,000-20,000 Japanese throughout the nation. And they were paid approximately three
times the average salary. The government budget could not sustain that; they had to reduce the
budget. And according to the internal documents of GHQ, you can see clearly that that was the
reason, that was the situation. And they decided that the Tokyo Trial has already gone through the
difficult process, it's already finished, and that is why they decided to disband the team after 12
months. CCD was in existence for about five years because it was necessary for GHQ to implement
its fundamental policies and CCD was aiding that process.
Next, I'd like to talk about PPB, Press, Pictorial and Broadcast division. And please refer to the
material, figure 3, that's another chart which might be a bit difficult for you to read. There is a quite
complicated censorship process stipulated by PPB for media. That's located in Shisei Kaikan in
Hibiya Park. That's the main body to conduct censorship of the newspapers. On the right side, press
section, this is for newspapers and press. On the left side, publications, this is mainly for the other
publications including magazines. The flow of the chart looks rather similar but they have some
different types of censorship. And this censorship was quite rigorous and quite conducted regularly.
PPB is not so much for intelligence as to drive or lead public opinion more or less in favor of the
GHQ or occupation forces, not to the Japanese government. As Professor Takahashi will talk about,
CIE was also involved in this process. While CIE was in charge of the enlightenment or education
for Japanese citizens for the sake of GHQ. But PPB is under the CCD detachment. I have just five
more minutes. So, that's a secret organization, not publicly disclosed. The PPB was almost invisible
to the people's eyes. Asahi Shimbun and the domain news agency's activities were often suspended
because of the violation of the press code set by PPB. A Chinese processor talked about why the
Japanese censorship was so severe. Because those major newspapers or the major news agencies
were pre-censored before they published their information. Before they dispatched information, they
should submit all of the information to be published to GHQ. For example, major newspapers, they
have 14 or 15 circulations a day, so that led to quite complicated task because they have to submit
their information beforehand to GHQ. That type of censorship did not exist at all in Japan even
before the war, even during wartime. That's quite rare in terms of censorship. That might be much
stricter compared to the censorship which is conducted in China. After a while, GHQ came to the
conclusion that those who have become more obedient, they are the subject for post-censorship
rather than pre-censorship. Most of the Japanese media showed obedient attitudes toward GHQ so
such propaganda to talk about imperialism was completely eliminated. Most of the opinions as
initiated by CIE, the basic tone of the media has been more or less orientated to a demilitarization
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and disarmament. And one of the examples is that Hideki Tojo's deposition document which was
suspended for publication. I do not have enough time to talk about the details. That was published by
Yoyo-sha, the publication. Yoyo-sha published that deposition record of Hideki Tojo based on the
post-censorship. GHQ paid great attention to the cover page that said the emperor does not have any
responsibility; the whole responsibility shall be assumed by me. And GHQ was aghast to see that
catchphrase on the cover page because they thought it would be propaganda to pay respect to a war
criminal, even though GHQ issued an order to collect all of those already published books, but as
many as 13,000 copies were almost completely sold and GHQ got upset, so the Yoyo-sha was a
subject for pre-censorship after this affair. For the execution of the Tokyo Trial, censorship had been
conducted for the facilitation of the Tokyo Trial's procedures. So, in that sense, censorship in postwar
Japan might have looked less severe in the current Chinese censorship, but seen from the modern
Chinese people's perspectives, that's even more stringent compared to that in China at the current
time. GHQ's tactics were quite well-prepared, because GHQ was in white and black propaganda, and
CCD is in black propaganda and CIE was in charge of the white propaganda. That should be the
subject for us to cast more light on to the future studies, because that's actually happened in the
postwar history of Japan. Now, quite recently, I happened to find a list of the people, as many as
15,000 people, those who worked for the CCD and the PPB, but they were not written in kanji, they
were just Romanized names, so we don't know who they are, and Jun Eto talked about that there
have been no people to talk about the censorship in the postwar era, but since we have the list, I wish
we could get more cooperation from those people if they are still alive, because censorship is a kind
of national aim that's actually a violation of the Japanese Constitution which prohibits censorship.
And some of those people have already started to talk about what they had conducted in censorship.
So, I wish we could do more work on what happened in the censorship, but one of the undoings is
that the former ministry of post and telecommunications was still reluctant to disclose those
documents. But it is certain that there is a list of those who worked for CCD because the ministry of
social welfare communicated some of them because they are eligible for public pensions for working
for the CCD. So, I dared to take up this topic of censorship for what happened in postwar Japan. As

























































































































































































































































From a Point of View about the Educational Reform in Post-War Japan
Good afternoon, I'm the last speaker. It seems that the goal is visible and please bear with us for
the next 30 minutes. First of all, I'd like to extend a sense of gratitude to all the concerned parties
including Kokushikan University's secretariat to give me the opportunity to present in front of such a
distinguished audience. I believe that as I study postwar Japan's ideology, under the name of
civilization some researchers just condemn Japanese national characteristics as pathological or
pathogenic or something like that. So, I wonder if you heard such a theory of Japanese nature, they
are traditionally aggressive policy, and also the militarism of Japan is rooted in its nation's nature, so
this type of argument has been rife by many researchers, and I hope that, I'd like to share with you
my thoughts about this. Actually, there was a misconception presented by some of the
anthropological researchers about the Japanese attitude toward the war or militarism. That type of
misconception serves as a platform for the occupational policy toward Japan. There is a War Guilt
Information Program of GHQ. I'd like to touch on this issue because this has something to do with
the Tokyo Trial's implications, and that had many consequences or influences over educational
reforms in postwar Japan. War guilt is a kind of information, a propaganda plan that is associated
with the Tokyo Trial. The first mention of such information was done by Jun Eto, a famous author,
but according to Wikipedia information, it describes that in Jun Eto's book called Tozasareta Gengo
Kuukan, he argues that this War Guilt Information Program is based upon GHQ's internal documents,
and then a supporter of Eto affirmatively used this particular name of "War Guilt Information
Program"; however, internal documents they mentioned have not been disclosed by Eto or other
parties. It is very doubtful that this information really exist. But that's not true. It is included in CIE
documentation or that would have been published already. It's clearly stated, "War Guilt Information
Program." So, all these topics aside, I'd like to get into my main topic of today's presentation.
Ruth Benedict, cultural anthropologist who presented some OWI views on the cultural strategy
and also the psychological operations toward Japan. Occupational policy by the state department of
the US and GHQ succeeded on that front.
So, the assessment of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth Benedict should be discussed
in the continuity of the prewar, during the war, and postwar policy toward Japan by the US. First of
all, we have to be aware as Tetsuo Yamaori pointed out that The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was
"a study of the policies and asked by OWI of the US", so this means we have to pay attention to the
original intention hidden behind the dresses of this up front of the political science thesis.
Benedict, in 1944, took the responsibility of chief analyst in the foreign morale analysis unit of
OWI, and then Jeffrey Gorer recommended her as the successor of his position. She was requested
by the OWI to conduct national character research on the Japanese people.
In 1945, based on an initial postwar policy, there was a change. For the purpose of reorientation or
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reeducation of Japan, that was incorporated into the official policy of Japan. This is the basic policy
that was leading all the activities organized by the occupational forces.
About the scope of all the programs and the control, there are three major points. This type of
campaign has a deep influence over the Japanese mindset. Then, SCAP has to count on the reliable
Japanese people including females to take an approach indirectly to Japan. So, such Japanese
personnel has to be given advice and support and guidance and also proper positions in an effort to
help achieve such objectives of influence over Japanese people. We have to take advantage of all
available information media to meet this end and the approach should be persuasive rather than just
preaching. And for reorientation of Japanese people, it must be done through information provision
or education religious route. This was based upon the justification effort of the occupational policy.
So the mission of OWI was to carry out public relations and propaganda activities at home and
abroad. Most of the staff were newly liberals of the 1930s who participated in the leftist culture
movement called the "Culture Front" in the latter half of the 1930s. Archibald MacLeish, the
assistant secretary of state in charge of public and criminal cultural relations, appreciated this
ideology and thought that the psychological tactics toward Japan that Benedict and others had
studied should be applied to a postwar program for the country. He explained the importance of
reeducation and reorientation of Japanese and made clear mention of the reeducation policy of
reforming the spirit of the Japanese in document SFE-118, control of media and publication
expression ofJapan. An English version is available so you might refer to that later. War guilt, the
terminology used to explain the culpability or criminality of Japanese acts during the war.
Against such background, CIE's main duty took the lead in the postwar education reforms in
Japan, "psychological disarmament" aiming at reforming the spirit of the Japanese. Among the
information and propaganda activities carried out to achieve that objective, prime importance was
attached to war guilt and war responsibility campaign. Bradford Smith, chief of the plans and
operations section who had moved from OWI to the CIE, played a central role in this campaign.
In this section, the war guilt and anti-militarist team and then the special project branch were set
up to execute "War Guilt Information Program" which inherited the OWI's cultural strategy and
psychological tactics toward Japan. This program had the following nine objectives:
1) Demonstrating that it is ethically justified to punish persons who are revealed to have
committed the crimes of planning, preparing for, initiating and executing or participating in the
execution of an aggressive war.
2) Demonstrating that prosecuting suspects of war crimes benefits all humanity.
3) Demonstrating that punishment of war criminals is requisite for rebuilding the peace and
prosperity in Japan and achieving war security in the future.
One of the most important messages is expressed in 4).
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4) Demonstrating that while the war criminals should bear the primary responsibility for having
caused the hardships that the Japanese people are currently experiencing, Japanese people
themselves should also be held jointly responsible for tolerating or proactively supporting
militarism.
5) Clarifying the responsibility of Japanese people in order to prevent the revival of the regime
that allowed the war crimes.
6) Demonstrating that various groups in Japan such as politicians, businesspersons and leading
demagogues should bear responsibility for the war.
7) Demonstrating that the war criminals are to be tried and judged in a fair open court.
8) Clarifying that the persons responsible for atrocities such as General Tomoyuki Yamashita do
not deserve to be given consideration in terms of their honor in the process of deciding on their
punishments in order to suppress in advance the expected criticism against the death sentence to
be handed down on them. And
9) Leading the Japanese people to discuss the issues of war criminals.
In order to present the critical justification of the Tokyo Trial and make clear the responsibility of
the Japanese people who are engaged in aggressive war, those objectives were put into operation in
the following three stages around the period of the Tokyo Trial. The first stage was before the
opening of the trial from December 1945 to May 1946. The second stage, during the trial, from June
1946 to February 1948, and third, until handing down the verdict in the trial, from March to
November 1948.
Based on the US official view of history, compiled in publication titled Peace and war, historical
articles on the Pacific war were published in Japanese newspapers under title of Taiheiyousensoushi
{the history). War Guilt Information Program, as indicated earlier, presented itself as a guideline to
educate, enlighten, and reorient Japan. Here, it says that this is a very precious material to talk about
how the postwar reeducation started. Part of the discussion will be shared starting now. Why is it that
we are experiencing this state? What is the reason why Japan got into this status? Who is responsible
for that? What is the root cause of that? The leaders should be held accountable for the waging of
war that put the nationals in a precarious situation. That type of concept was misleading, so that is
why we are facing this situation. However, those leaders of Japan made some mistakes because there
are some inadequacies in the institution of the Japanese nation and social mechanism. There are
some weaknesses in the way of thinking of Japanese people themselves. And Japanese nation as a
whole must reflect upon this particular point, especially in the education. Educators have to be fully
aware of that. Some of the defects are presented by this: Japan cannot reform itself fully and they are
dependent on old ideas; Japanese nation does not respect humanity, individuality or personality; lack
of critical thinking; the level of scientific achievement is still low because Japanese people lack a
spirit of rationality.
There were some notes and information produced by Benedict and others that were utilized by the
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office of war information, OSS as well. Staff members at "OSS Far East orientation school" were the
subject of the lectures by the authorities.
However, Charles Douglas Lummis describes a new look at Benedict's Patterns of Culture and
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Just as the societies described in Johnathan Swift's Gulliver s
Travels, Plato's The Republic, Utopia of Thomas More, or 1984 by George Orwell never existed,
Benedict's "pattern of culture" also never existed. The Japanese society described in The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword also never exsisted.
Benedict was aiming at the morality and also the national spirit of Japan. She labeled them as an
aggressivism. Benedict tried to promote this policy of not insulting Japan and focused on the belief
in the emperor; The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was an aggressive or militaristic political paper.
There was also a type of window-dressing. And therefore it was criticized politically and also
socially. And this dual structure was criticized because people could see what she was trying to do
with this window-dressing.
"Cultural relativism" and "pluralism" are important to anthropologists. So they have to be open to
foreign cultures. But the biggest problem of Benedict's research was that under the name of
anthropology, Benedict tried to classify Japan into two dualistic simple categories: guilt and shame.
Pauline Kent of Ryukoku University described in her book, Behavioral Patterns ofJapanese, that
she tried to understand the culture scientifically and objectively.
Anthropologists need to be neutral, but Benedict could not continue to stick to the relativism
when researching Japan because Benedict talked about alien enemy. She said, "What should we say
in a propaganda to save the lives of Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last
man?" This was chapter one of the book. Of course, this was a strategic paper; it included strategic
intent to be used as propaganda by the US government.
So, this book talks about why polite and obedient Japanese tend to become really violent. It tries
to address the duality of the national characteristics of the Japanese. Her report, Japanese Behavior
Patterns, was the basic paper for chapter one through four, and 12 and 13 were added later.
Hierarchy and the system and the trust in hierarchy are positioned as a keyword to understand
Japanese. "Hierarchy is the constant principle", as typified by the emperor system. She said:
"Their reliance upon order and hierarchy and our faith in freedom and equality are poles apart. ...
'Equality' is the highest most moral basis for American hopes for a better world. We uphold the
virtue of equality even when we violate it, and we fight against 'hierarchy' with a righteous
indignation."
So, the difference between the US and Japan according to Benedict was a simple dichotomy:
"hierarchy" vs. "freedom and equality". Benedict states that the Pearl Harbor attack was based on
"the 'pathological nature' of the Japanese who were really stuck with this idea of hierarchy".
Richard Minear says that according to Benedict, the Pearl Harbor attack is a typical example of
the pathology of Japan.
The "traditional aggressiveness" was the cause of the aggression and this book by Benedict is
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mostly dedicated to eluding to how this was built over time in the Japanese tradition.
In chapter three, taking one's proper station is discussed. Trust in this hierarchy system developed
into the tripartite agreement as well as a declaration of war against the US.
In chapter 13, Benedict discusses postwar Japanese and the significance of the American
occupation. :all of the dangerous patterns of aggressiveness have to be removed and a new pattern
has to be pursued. Benedict mentioned that there is the culture of crime or sin which is based on
internal criteria and there is also an external criteria which is based on "alien or foreign" criteria.
Now, all these "dangerous patterns of aggressiveness" or the "traditional aggressiveness" or the
"intrinsic militarism" was criticized by Helen Mears who wrote the book Mirror for Americans:
Japan.
John Dower said that the aggressiveness and violence of the Japanese was always mentioned in
the discussions among the allies and it was positioned as an observation, a finding through
anthropological research. By the way, MacArthur said that Japanese people's spiritual age is 12 years
old, according to Western standards. There was a two-day discussion to analyze the behavior and
psychology of the Japanese including psychologists, psychiatrists and all the other experts. Based on
this discussion, they identified 28 common points shared between American delinquents and
Japanese. For example, total disregard for life and also total isolation of strangers. These are a
hypothesis, but unfortunately, the hypothesis was used as the basis for the occupational policy, so it
was very regrettable that such labeling took place, but Embree, an American anthropologist was
aware of this. In his paper, he clearly provided a criticism. "'Toilet training for small children before
they learn how to use the toilet is done at a young age in Japan, which leaves trauma in the minds of
the Japanese people, causing national pathology. That is why they respect the emperor.' There is only
a handful of people who believe that methodologically it is wrong to jump from these individual
psychological reactions to toilet training."
Gorer and Benedict believed that toilet training was the cause of the aggression, at least as a
hypothesis.
By industrialization and Westernization, the Japanese suddenly decided that they could respect
their own culture.
In Anthropological Intelligence, David Price says as follows: a lot of military research is based on
the secondary source material, which is just a repeat of the typical stereotype. And the
anthropologists tend to have this misunderstanding of applying just one single factor to all of these
hypotheses.
Under the name of "democratization of education", America tried to disarm Japan spiritually
through indirect control, and the hypotheses of Benedict and Gorer were taken advantage of. Embree
pointed out it correctly, but he was assassinated by the FBI in 1950 (David H. Price, Threatening
Anthropology, Duke University Press).
What does this fact tell us? Japanese occupation was a "clash of civilizations" and there was a
filter applied in assessing the Japanese. What we need to do is move away from the filter so that we
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can tell the true story of the Japanese culture and the Japanese.
The 2002 summit in Johannesburg was the place where Japan stressed the importance of the
environment and society and "culture as a foundation for all". And in 2005, there was an
international symposium in Paris, and the final declaration said that there is a danger of cultures
being unified through globalization. It is not the clash of civilization but ignorance about civilization
that would cause conflict. So we need to revisit the thought process and restudy what's been believed
and promote intercultural dialogue.
In 2007, the Declaration for Nurturing Holistic Approaches Towards ESD (Education for
Sustainable Development) was issued. It stressed the importance of the creative inheritance of
traditional culture. "Syncretism" and "integration of tradition and the modern" were the important
keywords that were stated in this declaration.
Globalization continues in the 21st century. We need to creatively reevaluate the global value of
the Japanese culture. Huntington cites Japanese civilization as one of the most important civilizations
in the world, but as a result of a clash of civilization, there exists misunderstanding and fixed notions
about the culture and the people of Japan. In order to correct this distortion, we need to shift from the
state strategy-type discussion to a much more long-term concept.
Thanks to Gorer documents at the University of Sussex, Benedict documents at Vassar College,
Helen Mears documents at Swarthmore College, and documents at Butler Library of Columbia
University on the assessment process of the occupation, we now know that a result of bias, there is
ignorance about Japanese civilization, which stated that the cause of aggression was pathology and
traditional aggression and militarism.
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was one-sided and Mirror for America: Japan was more
objective, but MacArthur did not allow this book to be translated or published at the time. These two
books are assessed in completely opposite ways between Japan and the US but we need to take a
look at both in order to further study of civilization and the result of this research will be published in
both Japanese and English.
As Professor Mochizuki mentioned, Prime Minister Abe met the grandson of Judge Pal, which is
attracting a lot of attention. So, this is a great opportunity for us to do joint research with India so that
we can present something with deeper understanding of the international situation at the next












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SHINOHARA: So, ladies and gentleman, it's time for us to resume the session and to commence the
panel discussion with the lecturers and the presenters. And as you can tell from this time table, we
are going to have a panel discussion from now, and we are going to entertain some questions at 5:10
and we are going to continue up to 5:40; that's the time table we have in our mind right now. We
have the honor for the presence of all the presenters and lectures on the podium, so we'd like to have
a fruitful discussion. And this is how we would like to proceed. For the morning sessions, our
presenters are Professor Mochizuki, Professor Higurashi, Professor Osten and Professor Ushimura.
And we would like to have some mutual discussions by letting them pose some questions for those
morning sessions' lecturers. After then, I would like to move onto the afternoon sessions' presenters:
Professor Doak, Professor Ikeda, Professor Yamamoto, and Professor Takahashi, for the same for
panel discussions by letting one of them ask questions of the others to raise some points for
discussion. So, this is how we would like to see it. So, first, for Professor Mochizuki, Professor
Higurashi, Professor Osten and Professor Ushimura, and we'd like to entertain some questions from
the other panelists. So, Professor Ikeda.
IKEDA: I have one question to ask of Professor Mochizuki. In the morning session, Professor
Mochizuki talked about the political issues of, for example, Prime Minister Abe paid a visit to
Yasukuni shrine and U.S. government officials stated their views because they were disappointed,
and who said he or she was disappointed or we were disappointed among the U.S. government?
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That's the one point. And the second, you referred to Prime Minister Abe's meeting with Judge Pal
in India. That was surprising that you talked about it.
The discussion in the U.S. might be a bit different from what we have discussed in Japan in terms of
Judge Pal. So, what is the reason for that? So, do you have any takes for my questions, Professor
Mochizuki?
SHINOHARA: So, Professor Mochizuki. We have the simultaneous translation so you can say
anything either in Japanese or in English.
00:08:01-00:12:53 Prof. Mochizuki
MOCHIZUKI: Professor Ikeda, thank you very much for those questions. The first question is easy
to answer because I don't know. I don't know who the individuals are that may have crafted the
statement of disappointment that, my understanding, came from the State Department and the U.S.
Embassy here. But, I think it reflected a predominant view in the United States that the visit by Prime
Minister Abe to Yasukuni at a particularly delicate time, a sensitive time in Japan's diplomacy with
not just China but the Republic of Korea, that visit to the Yasukuni shrine was not good for Japan's
diplomacy. I think that was the general view. So, you know, there may be particular individuals that
crafted that statement, but that probably is not the important issue. I think it's much more important
that that reflected a widespread view, and some thought that it was much more than disappointing.
And, you know, I wrote an article prior to that visit that if Prime Minister Abe did go to Yasukuni at
that time that it would be a disaster in Japanese foreign policy, and I think it was a major setback. I
personally, you know, along with Ambassador Togo are advocating a reform of Yasukuni shrine
visits, and that there'd be a moratorium of prime minister visits until that reform, and I've written
many times that Mr. Abe, given the support that he has from those that support Yasukuni, that he is
in a good position to reform Yasukuni.
On the point about the visiting of the grandson of Judge Pal, what I was merely doing was reflecting
stories that weren't in newspapers because that part of the visit to India got so much attention. And,
you know, it's quite clear from the American perspective that Judge Pal's dissenting opinion,
although, you know, scholars like Richard Minear have given a positive view, that in Japan he has
kind of become the symbol of a critique of the Tokyo Trial which in my view unfortunately misses
some of the other important contributions of the Tokyo Trial, and I think that was the point I was
making in assessing the latest round of scholarship in the United States and other countries outside of
Japan. Professor Osten was referring to this in terms of the development of international criminal law,
and Professor Doak was talking about civic nationalism. You know, I think, I was struck that all
three of us were basically saying the same thing. And so, in some sense, the use of Judge Pal and his
criticism of the judgment at the Tokyo Trial I think in some sense has made it difficult to look
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seriously at other very important aspects of the Tokyo Trial which I see as being much more positive
than negative.
00:12:53-
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much, Dr. Mochizuki. And I assume that there will be some
questions from the floor later on in connection with this point. Could you please identify yourself?
TOGO: I'm Kazuhiko Togo, representing Kyoto Sangyo University. Let me go again and state my
opinion or a question in Japanese. And with regard to the Yasukuni shrine issue, I'd like to share my
opinion with the rest of the group. So, well, there has been a divided opinion as to how appropriate it
is for Japanese nationals to pay a visit to Yasukuni shrine, but put this issue aside. And back in those
days, Prime Minister Koizumi's era, he paid six visits. Compared with that time, Japan's political
situation has made a great experience of changes. Back in 2012, China has been making a foray into
Japanese territorial waters, a violation of Japanese sovereignty, so the situation is different now
compared with the Koizumi era. And we have to talk about this issue from the perspective of
deterrence as well as a dialogue. Without a minimum dialogue we might enter into another war, so in
order to protect us from that, we don't want to be provocative of the other parties more than
necessary. So, my opinion about Yasukuni shrine is that currently the prime minister of Japan is
visiting Yasukuni shrine, that might be too provocative from the perspective of Chinese nationals,
and on top of that, it is obvious that every member of the society or nation doesn't want to cause any
war, so "disappointed" is a sort of understatement on the part of American officials. So, well, I
myself presented my own view just to contribute to newspapers and magazines that this time around,
Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni shrine was a major debacle given the current political
circumstances. As of last year at least. So that was a critical problem that we have to deal with.
That's just additional information to this point.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much. Doctor? I'd like to take that topic and first of all, among the
lecturers, the eight lecturers on the panel, later on I would like to entertain other questions from the
floor. Any question from other panelists?
IKEDA: Professor Togo made a statement and I fully understand the U.S. officials' concerns or their
position towards this issue. And so we have repeated as similar situations. Of course that we have to
avoid, well, the worst-case scenario, that is a real dispute or the violence in the form of war. And
then, it's not desirable from every aspect of the international community. As Professor Kevin Doak
talked about, Japanese nationalism and then I believe that this is so difficult that, the war aspect, how
we can have a control over nationalism as opposed to protecting Japanese nation's interests or the
state interest? So, I'd like to ask again, Dr. Mochizuki, Mike Mochizuki, another question. Can you
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extend a little more sympathetic view of such behavior of Japanese politicians visiting Yasukuni
shrine to honor the memory of those that fought and died for Japan?
00:18:53-00:23:30 Prof. Mochizuki
MOCHIZUKI: That's a very complex subject. But I should first state that all countries and the
leaders of all countries should have very sacred places to honor the memory of those that fought and
died for their country. Whether or not the policies of that country were right or wrong, to die for
one's country is an ultimate sacrifice. You know, I was never, I was a very strong protestor of the
Vietnam War; I thought that was an unnecessary war. But I think we should honor the veterans who
died in Vietnam. Some of my close friends served in Vietnam, for what I thought was a misguided
war, and gave their lives. And my uncle was part of the Japanese Imperial Army. I'm sure he is
enshrined in Yasukuni shrine. So, you know, in that sense I think it is very important. But I think it is
also important that Yasukuni shrine be a place that also has a very cosmopolitan outlook and so
that's why I'm very much of a friend of the symbol of the Chinreisha, and I think my dream is that
Yasukuni would become a place where not just foreign leaders can go but the Japanese Emperor can
go once again. One other point that I would like to make is that, you know, I know that some
segments of Japanese society, there's this notion of a masochistic history. And, you know, my mind,
you know, I'm not sure that that's the right way of looking at things. And I know that even in the
United States, there are those that want to have, to deny some of the terrible things that happened in
U.S. history, slavery, what I think is essentially the genocide of Native Americans, you know, we
have a difficult time in facing up to the historical past as well, and so who are we as Americans to
talk about this? But for a country to look at some of the terrible things in its history and reflect on it
and learn from that I think is, as I mentioned in my presentation, it should be a matter of national
pride. One of the things that made me most proud to be an American citizen was when the United
States passed an act of Congress to, passed a law, to apologize to Japanese Americans who were
interned in concentration camps. The president of the United States, President Ronald Reagan, sent a
letter of apology to my father and other Japanese Americans along with a check for $20,000. But that
did not end it. You know, afterwards, the National Park Service took over the management of all of
the concentration camps and with grants paid for by American taxpayers and private donations, those
camps are being restored and the memory of that tragic period in American history is forever
maintained so that that kind of tragedy would never happen again. And so it's always important to
remember that history and that gives me pride as an American rather than to say, "Well, to focus on
those things is a case of masochistic history."
00:23:30-
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SHINOHARA: Thank you very much, Dr. Mochizuki. So, that ends the first part of the questions for
Dr. Mochizuki. And I would like to continue. And then, members of the panel, if you have any
questions for Dr.Ushimura, we'd be happy to entertain your questions.
00:24:06-00:25:31 Prof. Doak
DOAK: I would, I would like to ask a question. I found your talk very interesting. And particularly
the notion that there's, I think you called it, ichigenron and nigenron idea of bunmei. But when you
got to Mutsu Munemitsu's discussion of bunmei, I wanted to ask you if he had ichigenron or
nigenron view, because when he talks about Japan, he says Japan is a part of, or at least expresses,
the seiouteki bunmei. So, it suggests to me that he has a universal notion of civilization Japan can
become part of; not fated by its geography or by its culture. And also the exact language I thought
was really interesting in the quote: "seiouteki shinbunmei touateki kyuubunmei"\^W^W\^yft ^ M
Sl^J IS^C^] And if you think of it temporally, is he really suggesting not nigenron but one
ichigenron that's subject to history and that the problem for China was that it was in the past and that
its form of bunmei, its form of civilization may have to change into the modern so that the modern is
the ichigenron} That's what I would like to ask you to help clarify for me, please.
00:25:32-
USHIMURA: A question about Mutsu Munemitsu. Since Fukuzawa, yes, there was the notion of
ichigenron, and Mutsu goes away from that-New and old civilizations. Emerging nations so to
speak, that's the new and emerging countries or states. That's why it's called new, versus the old
Western civilization, so he's not saying there's an old Western civilization versus a new Western
civilization. In China, it's not old versus new. It's obsolete versus new. And Mutsu is a little bit
different from the mainstream civilization discussion since Fukuzawa. Thank you.
If I may ask a question to Professor Osten. Well, it's a little bit strange to ask you a question since
I'm sitting next to you, but I think people in the audience would be interested. So, international
criminal law, you're a researcher, you're German. That is why I would like to ask you a question.
When we have an international symposium, we have to basically represent our own state, own nation,
when we are asked to make a comment, which makes it difficult sometimes. For my part, when I was
teaching Japanese literature in Canada, I used to receive questions, something like "What is
'Yamanba' ?" This time, my question is more academic. You talked about the framework of the
Tokyo Trial, which was basically a copy of Nuremberg in many fronts, in many aspects. In Germany,
the Nuremberg Trial view, how has that changed over time in the minds of the general population as
well as academics? What kind of discourse has taken place so far? And also, German researchers,
how do they see the Tokyo Trial? What's been their discourse? Those are the two first questions.
And one additional question. More than 30 years ago, in Ikebukuro we have a building called
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Sunshine City, and there was an international symposium for the Tokyo Trial held in 1983. At the
time, Germany was still split into East and West and we invited international law expert from
Western Germany. From the university of Ruhr, I forgot the name, but anyway, this professor said,
oh, yes, that's right, Knud Ibsen, Dr. Knud Ibsen, he said that after the war, Western Germany
continued to pursue the criminal responsibility of the Nazis precisely because they broke, they went
against, the domestic law and regulations to gain the administration or the power. So the pursuit
continued, but in Japan, during the war or before the war, there did exist responsibility but Japan
basically abandoned the pursuit of the responsibility, whereas Germany continued the pursuit. And
an ethical discussion is still going on. Nazis basically broke the internal domestic law, and Japanese
leaders did not. From that perspective, how do you see the situation in Japan? Rather than generate
sentiment for a crime for war, does everybody in Germany really share this understanding that the
Nazis did actually break the law? That's the thing I want to ask you to clarify for us. Thank you.
Those are the three points, Professor Osten, if you could respond to those questions, thank you.
OSTEN: Thank you very much for your questions. Regarding the first question, how the Nuremberg
Trial were perceived or accepted in Germany and how the discourse has changed over time,
particularly compared with Japan: Up until the 1960s or 70s, in the academia, specifically in legal
academia, I think Japan and Germany shared very similar perspectives because censorship was
imposed in West Germany after the war similar to Japan. Critical papers could often not be published
for several years after the war. Also, taking the Nuremberg Trial, up as a research theme was very
rare immediately after the war because the Nuremberg Trial of the major war criminals (and the
subsequent Nuremberg Trial against lesser war criminals) were basically regarded as "fixed trials" or
a mockery ofjustice, not worthy of being evaluated as proper trials. That was the mainstream
thinking, but of course, there were exceptions such as Hans- Heinrich Jescheck; Professor Okuhara
in Japan translated some of these publications into Japanese. New international law and judicial
concepts implemented or applied in the Nuremberg Trial were reviewed or analyzed, but that was
mostly done by criminal law experts rather than international law experts. Up until the beginning of
the 60s, mostly those who served as defense lawyers at the Nuremberg Trial provided a very critical
view of the trial in their publications.In the late 1960s and since the beginning of the 1970s, however,
German national criminal courts began to prosecute Nazis and war crimes more and more actively;
subsequently, the Nuremberg Trial then started to attract strong attention. In the 1990s, war crimes
and crimes against humanity were occurring in the former Yugoslavian region. Suspects who fled to
Germany were handed over to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Since
the installment of this new tribunal, there was a new renaissance in Germany of research in the
international criminal law; as a consequence, the assessment of the Nuremberg Trial changed
accordingly, giving way to a comprehensive re-appreciation of these trials as important historic
precedents. Today, the Nuremberg Trial is widely accepted as constituting the starting point of
modern international criminal law; thus, nowadays the view of these trials is more positive than in
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the past. Scholars ofmy generation are studying aspects such as which arguments presented in the
judgement had an impact on the formation of subsequent international criminal law doctrine,
ultimately crystallizing into the ICC statute. In short, legal concepts established by the Nuremberg
Trial are now recognized as an essential part of the international criminal law framework.
Furthermore, other than in Japan: the factual findings of the judgment at the Nuremberg Trial are
serving as a foundation of the historical view of the Germans, i.e. the perception of history in
Germany today. The generally positive assessment of the Nuremberg Trial is facing only little
criticism.
The second question is if there exists any research regarding the Tokyo Trial in Germany. Due to the
widespread perception of the Tokyo Trial as being a mere rehashing of the Nuremberg Trial virtually
no legal research on the Tokyo Trial was conducted in Germany. That is why I - as the first legal
scholar in Germany - decided to write doctoral dissertation on the Tokyo Trial. Besides my book,
unfortunately no other legal monographies on this subject exist in German; no other legal scholars in
Germany are actively engaged in the scientific discussion of the Tokyo Trial.
With regards the third question, I don't know what Professor Ipsen said exactly, but if he stated that
Germany, itself- after the Nuremberg Trial - initiated domestic trials to punish those responsible for
committing war crimes, this is correct. These trials are still taking place. However, the Germans did
not initiate these trials right after the Second World War had ended. IN fact, the Frankfurt Auschwitz
Trials in the 1960s can be considered the real starting point of said domestic trials. Up until then,
Germans tended to forget what happened in Auschwitz, what happened in Nazi Germany. Though
the Auschwitz trials and other subsequent trials regarding the holocaust, some of the most horrid
details became the subject of criminal justice, and what had happened in Auschwitz and elsewhere
became widely known to the German public. That again triggered further active prosecution of Nazi
war crimes.
Would you please restate your question regarding whether or not the Nazis violated the domestic
law?
USHIMURA: ...???
OSTEN: The statute of limitations was in fact one of the hurdles for the prosecution of Nazi cimes
by German courts. Actually, in the early 1960s, the statute of limitations (as stipulated in the German
Penal Code) for manslaughter committed during the Second World War had already expired:
however, the statute of limitations for murder was extended several times and finally abolished in the
1970s, which allowed the prosecution of at least some of the grave Nazi crimes without any time
limit.
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Since the German courts at that time rejected the Nuremberg concepts of crimes against humanity,
genocide or war crimes as a legal basis for the prosecution of Nazi crimes, prosecution and
punishment in Germany were based on domestic criminal law, bound inter alia by the statute of
limitations. Today according to customary international law, it is widely recognized that there is no
statute of limitations for core crimes under international law such as crimes against humanity. In the
scholarly debate, it has been argued that the German domestic trials should not have been based on
domestic criminal law, but rather on international criminal law, i.e. the set of crimes as applied at
Nuremberg.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much. Any question, Professor Higurashi?
HIGURASHI: And I have another question to Professor Osten. My question is quite simple. How do
we put the crimes against humanity into a perspective in the Tokyo Trial? So, do you think if the
Tokyo Trial is just a rehashing of the Nuremberg Trial, do you think that crimes against humanity
will also be applicable? That might be a good fit for Germany; that may not be the case for the
Tokyo Trial. So, do you think that the Tokyo Trial should be put into the equal perspectives in terms
of the crimes against humanity? So what is your take?
OSTEN: Thank you for your question. Simply put,the Tokyo Trial could de facto have gone without
any notion of the crimes against humanity because in the case of Japan, no defendant was found
guilty on singular charges of crimes against humanity. The reason for this is that the notion of crimes
against humanity is based on the Nazi atrocities. In the Tokyo charter, some minor modifications
were made in order to adapt the provision to the conduct of the Japanese defendants. A particular
wording with regard to the scope of crime (i.e. its object) was deleted that otherwise would have led
to the exclusion of acts committed against combatants. However, because of these modifications, the
scope of crimes against humanity overlapped with other crimes, which caused confusion and
controversies in the Tokyo Trial. In the postwar era, the Tokyo Trial did not trigger a scientific
debate regarding crimes against humanity in Japan.
It should, however, not be overlooked that some legal concepts as defined and applied in Tokyo to
some degree influenced the further development of international criminal law, such as, for example
the notion of command responsibility (as stipulated in counts 54 and 55).This legal concept
definitely did have impact on the further legal debate and development of international criminal law.
Thus, even though the notion of crimes against humanity was essentially not a subject of the Tokyo
Trial, the Tokyo Trial did make some contributions to the formation of modern international criminal
law. This is also the case with regards to the "crime of aggression" as it is now defined in the ICC
statute. The wording of this provision is closer to the wording of the Tokyo charter than the wording
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of the Nuremberg charger. Therefore, the notion as stipulated in the Tokyo charter is still relevant
today.
SHINOHARA: So, this concludes questions for the first four lecturers. And then, I'd like to ask
members, our panelists to ask questions for the remaining four lecturers. Well, would you like to say,
I thought you're going to take up the microphone instead ofjust drinking water.
USHIMURA: I have a question for Professor Takahashi. Your presentation talks about how the
consequences of the Tokyo Trial have impact on the education policy on postwar Japan. I quite agree
on this point. For example, the second prime minister in the Democratic Party of Japan— I will
refrain from mentioning his name— was indignant at the general assembly Diet session by saying
"Japan IS a country of "shame culture", isn't it?" I don't believe that this prime minister has read the
original text of The Chrysanthemum and the sword. Apart from that, this case testifies to the
continuing influence of the book by Benedict, and the scale of influence is equivalent to that of
Haiboku wo Dakishimete, {Embracing Defeat) by John Dower published around the turn of the
century. Japanese readership society welcomed this particular title. Despite the fact that there was no
outright criticism against this book, one of the authoritative scholars that everybody knows of
approached me to ask me questions with a very skeptical attitude, "What would you say to this book?"
I got an impression that this renowned professor had a very negative view on the book. And many
people seemed to follow suit, but not in public. And then it seemed to me that their argument
centered around the inadequacy of the content of the book. Of course, the author is tapping on the
primary source of information as important materials but the trouble is, the way he treats the material
is selective. Despite this undeniable defect, the Japanese around the turn of the century paid special
attention only to the fact an American scholar wrote such a book on our country of such thickness
and admired him. That was the very reason a lot of people considered this book meaningful. And the
same thing could have been said about Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.
Takayoshi Kawashima, for instance, welcomed The Chrysanthemum and the Sword whole-heartedly.
Why do you think, Professor Takahashi, was such a view taken then by Kawashima and others?
Tamotsu Aoki, a well-known cultural anthropologist, once stated that at the time of the publication,
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was written based upon quite fair and just ideas. I believe that
Professor Takahashi is a specialist in such historical developments, so could you please share with us
a thought?
TAKAHASHI: There are many observations and assessments on The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.
It seems that at the beginning of its publication, immediately after that, the majority of assessments
or evaluations were quite affirmative. And then, first translated into the Japanese language, not many
Japanese readers just rushed to read this book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, probably
Japanese people, the majority of them were not thinking critically or they do not have an awareness
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of this issue. And today's main topic is related to educational theory. And then, why is it that Ruth
Benedict resorted to such an extreme idea about that Japanese traditional ways of raising children
might have contributed to the military action on the part of Japanese military or government? And so,
for example, if you look at the bushi or warrior samurai class, and then there are several mentions of
Japanese books or books which have influenced Ruth Benedict about her argument in The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword. And I don't believe that, well, all of them were wrong, or in terms of
what she pointed in the book, and that some of the aspects explored by the author that might have
been perceived as quite unwelcoming. However, more objectively, that is not the case.
USHIMURA: Along this line, may I just make a further comment? Why The Chrysanthemum and
the Sword has been being misunderstood in Japan is due partly to translation. I am NOT saying the
translation was not correct. Take Michio Takeyama for instance. Two years before his death, after
mentioning Benedict's dichotomy of a culture of haji and a culture of tsumi, where Benedict
considered Japan the former and Western countries the latter, Takeyama stated to the effect that if a
bicycle is placed near a station, in Western countries, it could be stolen by anybody, whereas in
Japan almost nobody would go to such extremes. He couldn't believe in the interpretation of
Japanese culture from the perspective of shame as opposed to guilt But the truth is, Benedict was
NOT saying "crime culture" but "guilt culture." This kind of misunderstanding by Takeyama came
to being owing to the Japanese word tsumi, which could be translated into several English words
such as crime, sin, and guilt, all of three being different from one another.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much. And then, Professor Doak?
00:53:44-00:54:42 Prof. Doak
DOAK: Question to Ikeda-sensei. At the conclusion of your talk, you suggested that, part because of
the Yoshida doctrine and for other reasons but especially because of the Tokyo Trial, Japan's
diplomacy lost independence; it was subordinate to the United States. My question is a very simple
one. Is there any country that has absolute independence over its diplomacy? Or in fact some people
would suggest that diplomacy by its nature is mutually constrained by other events and other
countries? So, I'm wondering if it's a fair criticism to say Japan, because of the Tokyo Trial because
of the Yoshida doctrine, doesn't have absolute autonomy over its diplomacy. Wouldn't you find that
every nation has some constraints over its diplomacy and this is just Japan's historical set of
constraints?
00:54:43-
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much, Professor Kevin Doak.
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IKEDA: Thank you for your question. And I stated that some obedience or slavery, that the some
obedience system was in place, and so this is not the common terminology and this is my own
original word. And Professor Iguchi might be ambassador for this, and Professor Togo, so in the
world of the diplomatic front, no others might have used this. The reason why I used this, submissive
system, was that, when Shigeru Yoshida made choices in the diplomatic front in Japan's Chinese
policy or other political issues, and then Masataka Kosaka, professor at Kyoto University that made a
statement on the Yoshida doctrine, and after reading those books and publications, it seemed that
well, that Yoshida believed that based upon his pro-Western European/United States approach,
Yoshida wanted to help restore Japan as soon as possible. And so, at that time, Japan like now, Japan
was not worthy of being independent immediately after the war. So, given that situation, that is why
Yoshida had to take an approach of pro-Western. And it seemed that all the military forces were
eliminated by American and also the allied powers, the occupation. And then it seemed that from
Yoshida's perspective, I assume that Yoshida was content with the fact that something that Japanese
people couldn't have done was done by the allied powers represented by the United States
eliminating all the military's activities and organizations from the Japanese nation. And so according
to the Kenkenroku, one of the publications that was very famous, and at that time, Shigeru Yoshida
was not equipped with any other measures rather than resorting to or depending upon the U.S.
initiatives. And at the same time, back in 1951 when Yoshida supported the U.S.-Japan security
treaty, at the same time as a peace treaty, is because of that, because of the necessity for Japan of
allied powers represented by the U.S. For example, looking at the historical issues and since 1910
when South Korea was annexed by Japan and we, Japan, colonized Korea for 35 years. So, because
of that historical development, there was a huge conflict and a confrontation between the two nations.
So, that is to say, Japanese governance back then was quite exhaustive and comprehensive. Of course,
Japan might have contributed quite a great deal to rebuilding South Korea after the annex; however,
that's somewhat disregarded by many people. Then, the Japanese imperialistic approach was sort of
hasty and that was perceived differently, wrongly, by others. When we look at the United Kingdom,
the United Kingdom had a lot of colonies, but their way of colonization seems to have paid attention
to the residents of those colonies, in the case of Malaysia or India, so when comparing these two
countries, Japan and the United Kingdom, perhaps international rules were more observed by the
United Kingdom compared to Japan, probably because Japan was falling behind in the
modernization because of an inferior approach. It's not too much of barbarians, that's kind of rude to
our ancestors, but it seems that the Japanese approach was too much dependent on forces rather than
the rules.
SHINOHARA: Any other points? Well, we need to ask to more people to ask questions, maybe? No?
Okay. I would like to ask Dr. Yamamoto. You have cited many examples, you didn't have time to
cover everything. So if you'd like to continue with some more interesting stories.
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YAMAMOTO: No, I have a question for Professor Osten. Censorship in Germany. How was it
different from that in Japan? And Western Germany, mostly governed by the U.S., what kind of
censorship was taking place? Does anybody do research in that area? Yes, Professor Osten, do you
have the microphone?
OSTEN: Thank you for your question. I'm not an expert in this area so I don't know many details.
As for the occupation zones administered by the U.S. and the UK, I have read there was a censorship
system in place for several years, at least in those two zones. As for the French occupation zone or
the Soviet occupation zone, I don't know (but I assume that some kind of censorship was installed).
At least in the U.S.-occupied zone, denazification was widely conducted as a policy, and as part of
that broader policy, "filtered" education was provided, i.e., the U.S. tried to deliver the "correct"
information to the German population, as this was one of the purposes of the censorship system. For
example, academic publications regarding the Nuremberg Trial - at least immediately after the war -
often had to go through a pre-check system before publication.
I don't know to what extent research on this topic is presently being conducted in Germany. I
apologize for my lack of knowledge. Thank you.
SHINOHARA: So that was a statement about the censorship in Germany. Dr. Yamamoto, I
understand that you lost your voice in China? Do you have any additional comments?
YAMAMOTO: Earlier, I didn't have enough time to cover all the points with the postal censorship
opinions against the war. Sorry, all information related to the war criminals had to be collected, and
there was instruction given to the people doing the censorship and then information was collected.
And war criminal suspects were sometimes captured by these examiners. So if your name appears on
the watch list, it's basically impossible to escape. That's how tight the control was and they had
duplicate and triple check systems in place to make sure that they could obtain the important
information. As Snowden indicated, the CIA is still doing a lot of things in the United States. So
similarly, during the occupation, in Japan, there was a tight net of censorship in which people had to
live. Something was even more effective than the postal censorship which is tapping of the phone.
And this had a very high success rate. In other words, a lot of secret information came from the
phone-tapping to TOS, but unfortunately there's hardly any record left. I have seen some rare
examples. GHQ's CIE personnel was in charge of the media and in relation to this, the president of
Kodansha publishing and a young career bureaucrat in the foreign ministry were having a
conversation, and this was wiretapped, but it was just a casual conversation about where to go
drinking that evening. And the person who was involved in the conversation are still alive so I asked
the person in question whether that was true and he said it was true. All that remains is useless pieces
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of information, and all the important records were deleted. So that's some of the topics that I missed
earlier.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much for adding to your earlier presentation. Now, are there any
questions from the panel? If you do, please raise your hand. No questions? Okay. I think we can take
some more time later for the interactions between the panelists, but now we would like to close that
temporarily for the time being and move on to the next session, Q&A from the audience. Hopefully
we can have an active discussion. During the break, we had informed you that we had question
sheets ready for your questions and we have indeed received some questions. So, the rule of the
symposium is that we will give priority to those who have submitted their questions using the
question form, and I will read it out and ask the panelist to respond. Starting with the first question.
A question for Dr. Ushimura. This is not necessarily directly related to the content of the presentation,
this is from Moriya-san. "I read the eighth chapter of the judgment of civilization. I want to write a
story about Blakeney. If I go to Shawnee of Oklahoma, do you think I can trace his story back to his
childhood? I want to know about the episode of exchange with Shigenori Togo and Yoshijiro Umezu,
and I understand that he lived in Sanbanchou in Kojimachi in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo, but I couldn't
find it, so if you know anything about where this house is located, please let me know."
USHIMURA: I am afraid I cannot give you a very straightforward answer. At the Tokyo Trial,
Blakeney was in charge of two defendants: Shigenori Togo and Yoshijiro Umezu, who signed the
agreement on the battleship Missouri. As to your idea of visiting his birthplace, I've never been there,
so I'm sorry I don't know how the idea will work. It's been a long time since he stayed there, so I
doubt that you can find any relevant information if you should visit. He learned Japanese—I forgot
the correct name of the school—but there was a school in the United States where he studied. That
might be a better place for you to go to and investigate.
As for the reason why Blakeney accepted to serve as an attorney for defendants Togo and Umezu, I
actually talked about that issue with the daughter of Togo Shigenori, also the mother of Ambassador
Togo present here today. We could not find the clear reasoning why Blakeney agreed. Togo was a
career diplomat, whereas Umezu was a general. Because some still say that at that time there were
two different groups of attorneys or lawyers, defending for military people or for civilians, but that
does not seem to be the case, because one attorney, Dr. Kenzo Takayanagi, professor of Anglo-
American laws at the Tokyo Imperial University, served only for the lieutenant general Teiichi
Suzuki. This might seem rather strange, because Takayanagi was often attacked by other attorneys
who served solely for military men. I asked a question of Higurashi-sensei, but we could not find
why and how those U.S. attorneys accepted their services. But one thing I clearly know is that
Mamoru Shigemitsu's attorney was George Furness, who did a fine job to defend general Honma in
the previous trial conducted in the Philippines, so Furness was asked by Shigemitsu himself to serve
as an attorney for this diplomat. And as for the location, I am sorry I don't know. One more thing-If
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you plan to write any story on Blakeney, one thing, one topic I wish you to take up: he was an
excellent teacher with outstanding style of English. If we take a look at how the English wording
uttered by Blakeney at the court, it looks quite sophisticated. He actually spoke in a very well-written
prose type of speech style, so I'm quite happy if you can write some story or episode on how
wonderful he has been as a teacher always stressing the importance of writing good English. And
please be sure to pay a visit to his grave in Aoyama Cemetery. Before start writing your story, please
make sure to visit.
SHINOHARA: Let me have the floor, did that answer your questions, Moriya-san? Any additional
questions? If you don't have any follow-up comment, but please wait for the microphone.
MORIYA: Thank you very much for taking up my questions for this setup. My wish is to write some
story for children to read with Ushimura-sensei's book. I found the location of Blakeney's grave so I
did pay a visit to his grave. As to his English, you said that his English was quite sophisticated and
very beautifully spoken and written, so I want to study a bit more.
SHINOHARA: Thank you. That's the first question. Do you have any follow-up answers, Togo-
sensei, do you know where Blakeney actually lived in the Sanbanchou of Kojimachi? Can you locate
the exact location?
TOGO: After the war, I paid a visit to a Blakeney's house so many times, so I still remember quite
vividly what type of house he was living, but right now, I completely lost the memories where it was,
but I could talk my impression to you so that after the talks we might meet.
SHINOHARA: And second question is raised for two lecturers. The content of the question is that,
"Concerning the shift and the transition of the view of civilization and the people's mentalities
before and after the Tokyo Trial, is there any difference between the Code of Hammurabi and the
first century or the time of Crime and Punishment by Dostoevsky? And another question is, do you
think that crimes committed by ISIS or any other crimes Boko Haram should be subject for violation
of international criminal law?" So that's the question to ask of Osten-sensei and Ushimura-sensei.
OSTEN: So, I don't know whether I get the point of the questions. Would you please follow up a bit
more in detail regarding the Code of Hammurabi and your question concerning the ISIS?
AUDIENCE: In the library of Kokushikan University, I don't know whether you took a look at, there
is a replica of the Code of Hammurabi. And the Code of Hammurabi is one of the subjects every one
of us learns when we are at junior high school. And probably that was inaugurated 3,700 years ago or
so, that's based on Mesopotamia civilization close to Baghdad. So, as for the domains, Jordan of
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Hussein, Syria, of Assad, including Beirut, that's the kingdom of that. The king of Hammurabi
controlled that nation and enacted that Code of Hammurabi. And what I have learned is that the basic
code of the Code is based on the Code of Hammurabi: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. So, this
is a retaliation with the equivalent substance. So, that's the start of "nulla poena sine lega". And then
we had the Tokyo Trial and nowadays we have the news of ISIS or the Islamic State. So, criminal
law has become more complicated. That might have led to the generation of the new crimes. So, the
point of my question is the punishabilities or the quantitative punishabilities. Has there been any
change between the time of the Code of Hammurabi around the 1st century, so how do you, do you
think that the punishability has been on an increase or the decrease compared to ancient time? And
the second part of the question is that, nowadays, there is the organization which is called the Islamic
State, or ISIS. It is something like a virtual organization. And that might be based on the traditional
Caliph schemes but seen from the current, seen from the prosecution standpoint, they might have
been already conducting some of the crimes which are subject for violation of international criminal
law.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much. As with regard to the first point, what is your response?
OSTEN: Thank you very much for asking such a multi-faceted question, even though I'm not sure if
I fully understand the underlying intentions.
Other than the time of the Code of Hammurabi, the power/authority to impose punishment is
nowadays not only monopolized by states, but today there is also a power of punishment - regarding
the most serious international crimes - derived directly from international law. The Code of
Hammurabi dates back to a time where mainly (but not exclusively) the state -if there existed any
state was responsible for punishing crimes. This concept is still valid today. However, under modern
international criminal law, the culpability of an individual and his punishment can also be based on
the punitive authority of the international community as a whole.
The second question refers to the Islamic State, ISIS, whether or not its actions fall under the
jurisdiction of the ICC. My understanding is that the ICC presently would not be able to adjudicate
such acts. The activation of the ICC jurisdiction requires that the state where the conduct took place
or the state to which the suspect belongs is a state party to the ICC statute. Furthermore, it is possible
to prosecute such crimes without fulfilling these preconditions if the Security Council of the United
Nations requests to do so by way of a referral to ICC. However, it should be noted that the ICC is not
a "super court" endowed with the competence to exercise law in every case. Based on the principle
of complementarity, the ICC is essentially a court of last resort; it generally only takes up a case if
related states cannot properly deal with the crimes at stake. Thus, according to the ICC statute, the
atrocities of the ISIS, which could be regarded as violations of international law constituting crimes
against humanity, at present cannot be punished by the ICC, as Syria is not a state party to the ICC.
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SHINOHARA: Thank you, Professor Osten. Do you have any comment or suggestion, Professor
Ushimura?
USHIMURA: I'm not a specialist in international criminal law and I can't present a definite answer
to the question. So let me share with you my interpretation on the Code of Hammurabi and have the
audience have a look at how to interpret history with this code. As you pointed out, even today
seventh graders are told in class about the existence of the Code of Hammurabi. That code seems
very shocking—"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." This is very shocking. Why? Junior high
students might ask questions. Very understandable question, to be sure, but historical interpretation
of the Code of Hammurabi has to be done based solely on the materials themselves in the context of
the time of its creation. After this procedure, we have to take a look at things from the modern
perspective as well. And then that has to be multi-faceted or at least dual. You might have an
impression that the Code of Hammurabi is such an atrocious; however, back then, the code was not
perceived that way by members of the society. Even then, well, murder was not tolerable, it's kind of
constrained. There's a constraint. Well, from the perspective of that situation back then, the Code of
Hammurabi was quite civilized, and then on conscience-based, their law, because you had a secret
right of retribution for crimes committed by others but even then you were not allowed at all to
retaliate by killing them. In many cases, people tend to criticize any type of laws and regulations in
the past based solely on your own contemporary idea or values. But that's not the way to go. Thank
you very much.
SHINOHARA: I hope that answers your question. And then moving onto the third question, number
three. This is a question for Professor Osten I'm going to read. The question goes like this: "The
charter of the Tokyo Trial and its verdict, together with the precedence of the Nuremberg Trial, do
they place a basis of the mainstream or basics of criminal laws? That is, common across the globe.
And then, regardless of whether the people like the idea or not, are they serve as a basis for in the
international criminal law?"
OSTEN: Thank you very much for your question, Mr. Hirota. Let me give you a short answer. Yes,
your understanding is correct. The charter and the verdict of the Tokyo Trial, together with the
precedents of the Nuremberg Trial, can be regarded as the starting point of international criminal law.
There is no doubt about that. As I mentioned in my presentation, the present state of development in
this field of law is reflected in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its statute. As for the
relevant substantive law norms, obviously the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were the starting point for
their development. The precedents established by the respective verdicts have become part of
customary international law.
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Not every violation if international law provisions, however, can be prosecuted and brought to justice
in the current framework of international criminal jurisdiction. Powers like the USA, Russia and
China are not state parties to the ICC statute and therefore do not participate in its judicial system.
Moreover, not all the controversial issues raised at the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials have been
resolved or overcome. However, the international community has since made an effort to overcome
the initial difficulties; a legal framework has been set up to bring about an improvement by
eliminating the one-sided approach as observed in the Tokyo Trial. Impartial ICC judges assess a
conflict situation in its whole, i.e. the ICC assesses potential crimes of all parties to the conflict
involved. Therefore, the government side as well as the anti-government side might be prosecuted at
the ICC. Thus, the ICC has been able to avoid criticism such as one-sided "victor's justice" so far.
SHINOHARA: Mr. Hirota? Any further comments or questions? Please wait for the microphone.
HIROTA: I appreciate very much your answer. It exceeds my expectation for my very simple
question. Thank you very much.
SHINOHARA: Thank you, so that's it for the third question. Moving on to the fourth question. This
is addressed to two doctors, Dr. Higurashi and Dr. Ushimura. "Judges for the Tokyo Trial, there were
opposing parties within the team for natural law and for positive law, so it is not really productive to
focus on how arbitrary the civilization historical view was by Prosecutor Keenan. And this war had
nothing to do with a conflict or clash of civilizations and it was not a clash of democracy versus a
totalitarian regime. I believe that the real reason, fundamental reason for the war was military,
political, economic, a conflict of interests. What is your view on this?"
HIGURASHI: Well, I think this relates to Dr. Ushimura's presentation as it relates to Prosecutor
Keenan, so I would like to ask Dr. Ushimura to answer, but in terms ofjudgment on civilization, if
we focus on this too much, you may think that the most important points about the Tokyo Trial
would be missed or blurred. So, I don't think it will give us a correct understanding if we see it from
just one of the two perspectives. Was it victor's justice or judgment of civilization? For instance,
there may be 70% victor's justice, so the civilization perspective also has to be faced squarely. That's
my position. Now, a judgment on civilization, as Dr. Ushimura mentioned, was already mentioned
by Robert Jackson, chief prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trial, and even earlier than that, Henry
Stimson mentioned this, and he was the father of international military tribunals so I think this was
the earliest example, possibly. And he talked about the legal and historical perspectives. The legal
perspective means rather than giving a summary punishment, you should just start with a trial for the
war criminals. So it's not the question of doctoring, just don't give the ruling immediately; make sure
that there's a trial, and give the defendant opportunity to explain himself and provide evidence. I
believe that's the foundation. Now, historical perspective or historical view, good versus evil,
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making sure that there is a solid record of the evidence in favor of the allies. So, justification of use
of weapons, and neutrality, I think that was definitely a part of that. And you also mentioned that the
war between Japan and the U.S. was not a conflict between democracy and a totalitarian regime but
it had more to do with the military, political, economic conflicts of interest. Yes, I do agree. There
was a conflict or clash of interests. And conflict between different regimes would be explained by
the historical viewpoint of "the judgment of civilization" that I mentioned earlier. That's all for me.
Thank you.
SHINOHARA: Thank you. Dr. Ushimura, would you like to respond to the question?
USHIMURA: Thank you very much for your question, Dr. Iguchi. Conclusion first, I do not believe
the war between Japan and the US was a clash of civilizations. This was a clash of interests in terms
of military, political, financial, and economic reasons. I don't think Keenan would have expected in
sixty years that we would be talking about "stern justice by civilization" today. And Jackson said that
the real plaintiff was civilization. How was his opening statement was reported in English
newspapers? I once investigated that. All I discovered was "The real complaining party at your bar is
Civilization." This statement was cited in the article but no mention of civilization was made in the
title of the article. Jackson really focused more on this point than Keenan, but the American
newspapers did not report at all the issue in detail, whereas in the Japanese newspaper, there was a
big headline stating that "were are waging a part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve
the entire world from destruction." Why did Japan focus so much on the judgment of civilization?
And why do we continue to hold this view after the war? And why did I write the book entitled
Beyond the "Judgment ofCivilization "? I think these are all related, and I introduced my hypothesis
before. Awareness of civilization or sensitivity to civilization was very high and strong. If something
is taken for granted, you would never really talk about it. But Japan was trying really hard to become
more civilized and finally we felt accepted as a first-class citizen of the world. But within Japanese
people's mindsets, civilization meant a great deal. And when somebody said that civilization is
judging your leaders, then, it must have really shocked Japanese people. The Tokyo Trial, just one
phase of the war as well as history and there is not big room that should be allocated to the judgment
of civilization, but if you think about the intellectual history of Japan as a whole, I believe it is
significant enough for us to talk about it.
SHINOHARA: Thank you. Dr. Doak?
01:41:30-01:45:07 Prof. Doak
DOAK: I'd like to follow up just briefly, because I want to thank Dr. Iguchi for putting his finger on
what I think is the most important issue with the Tokyo Trial, and one that we really haven't directly
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talked about. That is that the trial was riveted or conflicted between two notions ofjustice that he just
mentioned, positive law, jitteihou, or shizenhou, natural law, and there's been very little discussion
of that, and I think without discussing it, we can't get at the heart of why we still have to grapple
with the problems left by the Tokyo Trial. So that whether we talk about this as "judgment of
civilization" or "victor's justice," we're really trying to articulate what in law comes out much more
clearly, that when we talk about "judgment of civilization," this is way of trying to talk about
shizenhou, and when we talk about "victor's justice," it's a way of talking aboutjitteihou, or positive
law, and the reason for that is that there was in the Tokyo Trial a mixture of the forms of natural law,
seeking justice worldwide, with the substance of law which was still ingrained in positive law. And
in fact I think you can still say that international law is still limited by the conception of law as
positive law. Now, why that's important for the Tokyo Trial is because, when international law is
understood as simply a compilation of positive law, what we're saying is international law is no
more than a collection of the behavior of the powerful nations that can construct the treaties that
become the substance of international law. It's back to basically the treaty problem Japan was
introduced to the modern legal system with. What the Tokyo Trial tried to do, and we've heard this
in a number of the different talks here today, it tried to break itself free from the limitations of treaty-
based international law by appealing to all of humanity, but it really was ahead of its own time. It
was trying to do something in jurisprudence when it didn't have the foundation for that. And this is
why people talk about "victor's justice," because they quickly see that those countries that were
speaking in the name of the world, speaking in the name of humanity, trying to speak beyond their
own nation-state structures, trying to appeal to something called "natural law" without saying it,
brought them into this kind of conflict. In short, what I was trying to say in my talk was that because
it was so easy to see the Tokyo Trial was basically positive law masquerading as natural law, many
people particularly in Japan afterwards became very cynical about the equation of law and justice.
And in fact one of the problems has been the aftermath of the Tokyo Trial in Japan's legal culture,
there's been an overwhelming dominance of positive law. It's very hard to find somebody in Japan's
legal circles who will defend natural law today. And I would just end with a hope that more attention
to this tension betweenjitteihou and shizenhou and that maybe it's time to spend a little more
attention looking at the French justice Bernard's dissent which in fact mixed natural law
considerations with the problems of procedure in ways which the court was trying to play things out.
I think it's an excellent question. I want to thank you for that.
01:45:08-
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much. Do you have any follow-up from Dr. Iguchi?
IGUCHI: I'm now at the age of 84 and I'm a senior to Mr. Eto by two years, so I wish he was still
alive. And probably Mr. Hirota or Dr. Togo, your grandfathers have been directly to do with. But as
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for the foreign affairs ministry, I thought that was a wrong idea to prosecute Prime Minister Hirota.
And as far as I know, many of the people concerned with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not have
any sympathy for the Tokyo Trial because one of their senior members was executed. That's the
position held by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So that's the different perspectives might
be. And I think that Higurashi-sensei's publications for Japan trial and in that, so I think that you said
that U.S.-Japan war was not a clash of civilizations; it was a clash between democracy and autocracy,
it was not the case, not because of the ideology of democracy, but because of their national interest,
because what they have concern is that, like in America, Hull became the subject of the aggression
by Germany. That might be the loss of the U.S. interest, so that's quite evident in the dialogue with
Hull and the Japanese official. So, I do believe that idea is expressed by Hull was actually.
SHINOHARA: So, Dr. Iguchi mentioned the name of Higurashi-sensei, so do you have any follow-
up comment?
HIGURASHI: I did not talk about that the Japan-U.S. war was not the result of, was a result of the
clash of civilization. I also had not written so in my books.
SHINOHARA: Any further comment for Ushimura-sensei? No? Any comment from Ikeda-sensei?
IKEDA: And for, you talked about reminiscence about how in Japan there are two books or two
publications and Japan's aggression was in a conflict of the U.S. interest, and I completely agree
with that idea. So that's my only comment for that.
SHINOHARA: Thank you. And we have taken up all of the questions specified in the question
sheets. Do you have any questions? Or would you like to have the floor to ask any questions?
AUDIENCE: Thank you for this opportunity to make a comment. And you talked about crimes
against humanity. And I would like to follow up with something to do with the Tokyo Trial. As
Osten-sensei talked about, in the Tokyo Trial, there was no reference to the crimes against humanity,
but among the documents related to the Tokyo Trial, at least as seen from the current perspective,
there are so many conducts. There is one area which should have been the subject of the trial based
on the crimes against humanity. That's the biological weapons. That's Unit 731. Everybody knows
Unit 731. And another that the Japanese Army used the gas weapon, the biological weapon, in the
southern islands. So, to the best of my knowledge, that's in the U.S. archive, so that is why that is in
the public domain, and everyone started to know it, including the Chinese scholars, but that was not
disclosed quite recently because of the U.S., based on U.S. policies. So, I think that the current, there
is competition between the civilization between China and the U.S. and Europe. So, seen from the
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Chinese perspective, that might be a hidden weapon, because China can criticize Japan and China
can also criticize the U.S. by talking about how the U.S. has been egocentric by concealing those
facts. That's the natural perspective I may take if I were a Chinese scholar. So, I heard that there is a
growing interest in the Tokyo Trial in China or in the U.S., so do you have any ideas what's going on
in the U.S. or in China? So, if there is any comment from Professor Osten?
OSTEN: I'd like to say a few very brief words. As you mentioned, Unit 731 's conduct was not made
the subject of prosecution at Tokyo for political reasons. The results of the experiments were handed
over to the U.S. and the scientists involved were in turn exempted from prosecution in Tokyo.
However, in certain Class B and Class C war crimes trials such as the trials held in Shenyang (China),
the use of biological weapons was prosecuted and punished to some extent. This said, it is interesting
to note that in recent years there is a growing interest in China and other Asian countries in the
Tokyo Trial. I do hope that this growing interest wil also result in further research on less well
known historic war crimes trials in Asia.
SHINOHARA: Any other comments or questions on the floor? So, if you could identify yourself?
MOMOCHI: I'm Momochi, belonging to Nihon University, and I have a question for Professor
Mochizuki, Mike Mochizuki. So, in any nation, you mentioned that there is a sacred place for
political leaders in any country. And you mentioned that there is a criticism against the Vietnam War
and then for example if you visit Arlington cemetery, the president of the United States might pay a
visit to that to show respect to the war dead, for example. And so, apart from the evaluation of World
War II, and then Yasukuni shrine is considered as one of those sacred places for most Japanese
people. And there is a criticism against that. And we have to be modest about how we perceive the
historical understanding as to, we have to take lessons from the past and we have to face the
historical facts no matter how cruel and tragic are they. And also the American federal government
did a good job in expressing that apology to the Japanese Americans for the government's conduct
on them. Meanwhile, Japan hasn't done that in this regard. And so, this has much to do with today's
conditional point. And according to Kanji Nishio's point, the Japanese war is quite different, Tokyo
Trial's positioning is quite different from the Nuremberg Trial. So, the German, the war was an
extension of their domestic endeavors, and then so there seems to be no consequences that America
might have to reflect on in this particular case, and do you have any comment on that?
01:56:48-02:04:39 Prof. Mochizuki
MOCHIZUKI: ...For that question, and it probably relates also to the point that Ambassador Togo
was making about Unit 731 and chemical weapons. The first thing that I would like to say is that I
feel that Yasukuni should continue to be a place to honor the war dead of Japan. So, I think we agree
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on that. Where we may disagree is that, I disagree with the enshrinement of the Class-A war
criminals. You know, I think that the enshrinement goes against the custom of the criteria for
enshrinement of those that died in battle or as a result of injuries, and so this was a different political
rationale for enshrinement. And so, I always advocated a position that takes a different view about
the treatment of Class-A war criminals and I thought it was a mistake for Yasukuni. And I disagree
vehemently with the head priest, Matsudaira's decision to enshrine the Class-A war criminals. The
previous head priest was against the enshrinement. And I think if it didn't have the enshrinement, this
would not be such a major issue. You know, for a long time, Japanese prime ministers and the
emperor went to the Yasukuni shrine during the autumn and spring festivals that caused no
international outcry. But it's when the meaning of going to Yasukuni began to get distorted because
of one, the Class-A war criminals enshrinement, and, secondly, and I think this began with Prime
Minister Miki, that rather than continuing with the spring and autumn pilgrimages he went on August
the 15th, then that continued later on under Prime Minister Nakasone. And that I think led to the
complication about the Yasukuni pilgrimages. But, you know, I hope that sometime in the future a
Japanese prime minister, the emperor of Japan or foreign dignitaries can go to Yasukuni. It should be
that kind of place. Secondly, there's a lot of debate about the meaning of the war and I've been
influenced when I was a graduate student by many scholars in the United States that changed my
view of the war between the United States and Japan. One of my colleagues at Yale was James
Crowley who changed the way I saw the war and, you know, definitely was a war of conflicting
interests. Whether the so-called Manchuria Incident was just a matter of conflict of interest, there,
you and I may disagree. And so, so much of the discussion about the Tokyo Trial seems to be about
"Well, how do we interpret Pearl Harbor and the war between the United States and Japan?" But, you
know, I think that Japan wants launched a war of aggression against China, and so it's not just, say, a
regular kind of conflict between two countries that had different interests. But more important is that
because of the focus in the Japanese debate is so much on the crimes against peace and the crime of
aggressive war is that you lose sight of another very important aspect of the Tokyo Trial. And that's
about the conduct of war, the wartime atrocities. And this is what needs to be examined. Now, one of
the reasons for this complications is because the United States was so obsessed with the crimes
against peace, and as I argued, and this appears in Professor Totani's book, is that they only, the
prosecution only had six weeks to present the evidence about wartime atrocities. There was enough
documentary evidence that if it was done, it would've taken probably a full year. But this was done
in six weeks' time. And because of that, the educational kind of objective of the Tokyo war crimes
trial to educate the Japanese people about the atrocities was downplayed. I know that there is a
debate in Japan about whether there were any atrocities that were committed. I for one feel that there
were atrocities. And it's not just about the massacres at Nanking; it's also about the Thai Siam
railway, it's about the Bataan Death March, it's about the comfort women system, and so those are
the things that I think are the critical issues about the Tokyo Trial and this gets to Ambassador Togo's
point is that certainly from a Chinese perspective, changed the focus of the Tokyo Trial from this
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issue about against crimes against peace to the wartime atrocities and the American complicity in,
putting aside Unit 731, gives China a vehicle to feel that, you know, sin of omission in terms of the
trial. But I think the issue is about responsibility for the commission of wartime atrocities, and I
know that there are differences of opinion in Japan, but I agree with someone like Professor Hata
Ikuhiko that may not have been 300,000 that were killed in Nanking but the other extreme that the
Nanking massacres were an illusion I think is an illusion in itself. And if it's 40,000, that's too many.
Thank you.
MOMOCHI: In the interest of time, another comment from Higurashi, professor, and then there
seems to be a lot of different opinions about the enshrinement of A-class criminals at Yasukuni shrine,
of course.
SHINOHARA: Thank you very much for your kind attention. Professor Ushimura?
USHIMURA: Thank you, Professor Shinohara. I've been in teaching line for more than three
decades, so allow me to say one more thing. The framework of "the judgment of civilization vs. the
victor's justice" is a futile dichotomy. Then, how to resolve issues around that? Let me show my
thought concerning that. First of all, the primary sources of information should be shared and then
we should resort to critical thinking. "Critical" in the Japanese sense of the word—hihanteki— might
be perceived as sort of disapproval. Rather than that, critical thinking is required when people try to
take a comprehensive view of things. Another important attitude is, we must not resort to the act of
labeling, in particular when something connected to "views of history" is concerned. Let me take a
phrase of "a masochistic view of history" for instance. Should one make use of this phrase in
discussing history, one will very likely lead to a clear dichotomy between "a masochistic view of
history" and "a non-masochistic view of history," I am afraid. This attitude will lead to stop
productive thinking. Another important point is, transcending "discussion for the sake of discussion."
Prime Minister Abe, for instance, stated in the Diet last year that the previous world war was
recapitulated solely by the victor's judgment. Then, a newspaper, run not by the company whose
president bowed in public this summer but by a company literally translated into "everyday
newspaper" reported to the effect that because of this premier's statement we have to expect some
objections from not only from the US but from both China and South Korea as well. But the Tokyo
Trial was conducted by victorious nations, so "the victor's justice" is an undeniable truth. Premier
Abe referred none other than this historical fact, although he used a phrase "the victor's judgment"
instead of "the victor's justice." This case teaches us that we have to transcend that type of
discussion in order to have a comprehensive and exhaustive discussion on the point of a postwar
Japan and the Tokyo Trial.
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SHINOHARA: Thank you very much for your comments. Thank you for taking time out of your
tight schedule to attend this symposium. This is a first installment of this type. Three years from now,
as the president of this university mentioned, in the opening address, we would like to organize
another symposium centering upon the theme of the Tokyo Trial based upon the learning from this
time. So, thank you very much for your kind attention, all members of the audience as well as all of
the lecturers. Let's give them a big round of applause. Thank you so very much indeed. So, now we
































Thank you for the kind introduction. I'm Fukunaga, dean of the faculty of law. On behalf of the
sponsor and organizer of this event, I'd like to express my closing remark and greetings to close the
session. And thank you very much for your kind attention and participation for a long time on the
Tokyo Trial symposium, and also I'd like to extend heartfelt thanks to all the lecturers, Dr. Mike
Mochizuki and Dr. Kevin Doak and also Dr. Higurashi, Dr. Osten, Dr. Ushimura, Dr. Yamamoto and
Dr. Takahashi and also Dr. Ikeda participating representing Kokushikan University. Thank you so
very much for your kind participation and attention and for the great presentations. And then this is a
first attempt to explore the new horizon of the study of the Tokyo Trial. The fact that we have
initiated this process at this university, Kokushikan University, is such a tremendous pleasure on our
part. This is more than we can dream of. We are so delighted to report that. And as Professeor
Shinohara stated, we will be celebrating the centennial anniversary in 2017, and so on that occasion,
we would like to organize another symposium centered around this theme. And also, in the faculty of
law, of this university, in two years, in 2016, we will be celebrating the 50th anniversary since the
foundation of the faculty, and so we would like to take an academic approach to look at legal issues
relative to the Tokyo Trial as well. So, we would like to organize another event related to that. And as
Professor Osten and also Professor Ikeda mentioned, Kokushikan University's library an information
media center are equipped with a lot of precious materials related to the Tokyo Trial, and so we
would like to conduct research and analysis on those documents, primary information, as well, then
provide whatever necessary information to the general public. And lastly, I'd like to extend warm
heartfelt gratitude to all the people who have spent so many hours together with us joining the
discussion. And then the result of the presentation has shown, demonstrated, how seriously the
researchers presenting today are committed to this theme of the Tokyo Trial and implications of the
trials. And then I hope that the prosperity of this theme or further development of this theme into a
new sphere or new horizon, and all the best wishes for your academic activities and successful
endeavors going forward. And this will close today's symposium. Thank you very much, members of
the audience and lecturers and the panel.
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シンポジウム閉会の辞
篠原敏雄
以上をもちまして、シンポジウム「『東京裁判」論の新たな地平一戦後日本と日本人の精神一」を終
了させていただきます。
本日、８名の報告者の方々に、会場の聴衆の皆様とともに、大きな拍手を送りたいと存じます（拍
手）。
さて、各報告にもありましたように、「東京裁判」は、多様な観点から、また、様々な関心から、研
究・検討の対象となるものです。
今回のシンポジウムの成果を踏まえて、更に一層、「東京裁判」論の新たな地平が切り開かれていく
ことを、皆様とともに祈念し、本シンポジウムの閉会の辞とさせていただきます。
なお、本シンポジウムの成果は、報告書として公刊する予定でおりますことを、付け加えさせていた
だきます。
ご清聴、ありがとうございました。
閉会の辞英訳
Thankyouverymuch,ProfessorFukunaga・Ａｎｄthen,ｓｏｌ，dliketosayaclosingremarkfTommy
side・Thatbringsthesymposiumtoaclose・Andlwouldliketothinkalleightpresentersonceagain，
togetherwiththeaudienceLetusgivethemanotherroundofbigapplausa
Asyouheardthroughthesereports,theTokyoTrialarebeingstudiedanda､alyzedfiDmmultiple
perspectives､WehopethattheresultsofthissymposiumwillgivedrivetofUrtherstudyoftheTokyo
TriaLAndHnally,weplantopublishareportshowingtheresultsofthesymposiumtoday､Please
lookfiorwardtothisreport,ａｎｄagain,thankyouverymuchindeedfbryourkindattention
Thelecturerswillleavetheｒｏｏｍ,ａｎｄｗｅ，Ilbecollectingtheheadsets,thereceivers,soifyou
couldpleasebepatientwithusfbramomentThankyou．
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